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Note
For the Right Reasons:
The Rules of the Game for Institutionalists
RICK JOSLYN
The United States judiciary demonstrates better than any other constitutional
institution the inherent fragility of American democracy. There is a reasonable debate
to be had over when and exactly how the Supreme Court squandered the precious
legitimacy on which its very existence rests. Yet, today, observers must confront with
renewed urgency the impact crater of discontent that has been driven into the
institution. The Court has been weaponized, politicized, and villainized; it has been
lionized for its institutional heft. But increasingly loud voices have called for
foundational reforms. There is a scramble for solutions to check the Court’s
newly-emboldened right-wing majority and their ruthless quest to destroy
long-standing legal precedents. Some have questioned whether a countermajoritarian
enterprise such as the Supreme Court ought to exist. Standing amidst that crucible are
the nine Supreme Court Justices and the consequences of their decisions.
It is here, at this discordant juncture, where understanding why and how
Justices make decisions reveals peculiar insights into the judiciary’s role in
American democracy. It is also a place to investigate the primary motivation for
Justices that observers have called “institutionalist”—that is, jurists for whom the
above legitimacy crises animate their judicial philosophy. This Note begins and
ends with a curiosity into institutionalism as a legal and political phenomenon. For
the institutionalist, the legitimate ends justify the quasi-legal means. Thus,
institutionalism represents both a symptom and a cure of our affected judiciary and
our fragile democracy.
This Note ventures forth into this legal terra nullius. It unpacks the
institutionalist ethos by identifying the reasons that such consequentialist choices
are made and under which authority. Finally, it offers a compelling justification to
accept and respect institutionalist judging: to check the ominous march of
authoritarianism and populist demagoguery in the United States and around the
world. Conceiving of institutionalism as democracy’s Excalibur sword may raise
more questions than it answers. But, this Note asks whether it may represent a
budding prospect for global freedom.
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For the Right Reasons:
The Rules of the Game for Institutionalists
RICK JOSLYN *
INTRODUCTION
Institutionalism is having a moment.1 Amidst a conflagration of crises,
sensible words and temperate actions from leaders, perhaps unsurprisingly,
attract the attention of worried citizens. Maybe because it subverts our
expectations to observe government actors prioritizing stability over
personal ambition, the institutionalist is a fascinating creature to study
during a time of endemic public distrust of institutions and the figures who

*
Juris Doctor, University of Connecticut School of Law, Class of 2022. Many thanks to my faculty
advisor, Professor Kiel Brennan-Marquez, who supported me throughout the entire writing process and
helped to turn my hazy ideas into cogent legal analysis; to Professor Mathilde Cohen for her intellectual
counsel and for sparking my interest in this topic; and to my Great-Uncle, Professor Dennis F. Thompson,
for his inspiration. Thanks also to Professor Jamelia Morgan for her helpful input; Olivia Benson, my
Notes & Comments Editor, for keeping me and this Note moving forward; Mallori Thompson, for her
leadership and encouragement; and our Editor-in-Chief, Marla Katz, and everyone at Connecticut Law
Review for their belief in this project and tireless work improving this Note. This Note is dedicated to my
wife, Donielle Joslyn, for supporting and loving me through law school and life.
1
Adam Liptak, John Roberts Was Already Chief Justice. But Now It’s His Court, N.Y. TIMES (June
30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/us/john-roberts-supreme-court.html (describing John Roberts
as an institutionalist who wields substantial power on an ideologically divided Supreme Court); Chris Hayes,
How Will History Judge Barack Obama?, NATION (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/
archive/how-will-history-judge-barack-obama (“Despite his pledge to ‘fundamentally change the way
Washington works,’ Barack Obama was always an institutionalist.”); PBS News Hour: Shields and Brooks
on Hillary Clinton’s Election Candor, Trump’s Dealing with Democrats (PBS television broadcast Sept. 15,
2017) (describing Hillary Clinton, New York Times columnist David Brooks refers to her as an
“institutionalist” and attributes her election loss to Donald Trump to the reality that “[t]his election was about
anti-institutionalism”); Chris Cillizza, Mitch McConnell Just Went Off on Donald Trump and the Election
Deniers, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/06/politics/mitch-mcconnell-trump-electoral-vote/index.html
(Jan. 6, 2021, 4:37 PM) (suggesting that the reason Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell delivered
a speech excoriating efforts by President Trump and congressional Republicans to invalidate electoral votes
is because McConnell is “an institutionalist through and through”); Lisa Lerer, How Joe Biden Became a
Steady Hand Amid So Much Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/us/politics/president
-joe-biden.html (Oct. 8, 2021) (“Even in the 1960s, Mr. Biden was something of an institutionalist in a
blow-it-up generation.”). Commentators have prognosticated that President Biden’s persistent centrist
approach to government will allow him to succeed where past presidents have failed. Id. But see Eugene
Robinson, Ketanji Brown Jackson Must Wonder What She Has Gotten Herself Into, WASH. POST (May 5,
2022, 4:15 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/05/05/katanji-brown-jackson-must-wonderwhat-joining-the-supreme-court-means/. The Court’s present composition may temper the influence of Chief
Justice Roberts, who “no longer has the power to act as a swing vote between the court’s evenly balanced
liberal and conservative factions.” Id. As of this writing, Chief Justice Roberts faces an uphill battle reining
in the Court’s five dependably right-wing Justices.
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2

control them. Most prominently, President Joe Biden tapped into the
popular, de-escalating appeal of institutionalism throughout his winning
presidential campaign which fixated on a theme of “unity.” His Inaugural
Address implored Americans not to preoccupy themselves with what divides
them, stating that “politics need not be a raging fire destroying everything in
its path.”3 The appeal of that message lies somewhere in a recognition that,
during times of crisis, democratic institutions—taken for granted during
calmer times—appear more fragile than in the recent past.
For a democracy to succeed, caring for important institutions must not
be limited to the political branches of government. This Note investigates
how judicial actors can care for such democratic institutions when they set
aside ideological interests and decide cases with an eye towards guarding
certain unwritten rules and accepted norms that allow these institutions to
persist.4 Given the special emphasis on neutrality in the courts, there is a
sense that the institutionalist judge can better withstand the pressures of
political schisms and render verdicts that are not just fair but are in
furtherance of maintaining a functional republic. Yet, predictable problems
arise when democratic caretaking is left to judges. The reasons that make
institutionalism noble in the political branches can simultaneously raise

2

See Americans’ Views of Government: Low Trust, but Some Positive Performance Ratings, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/09/14/americans-views-ofgovernment-low-trust-but-some-positive-performance-ratings (explaining polling research showing that
“public trust in the federal government has hovered at near-record lows”). Just twenty percent of
Americans reported that they trust the federal government. Id.; see also CLIFFORD YOUNG & CHRIS
JACKSON, IPSOS, OUR AGE OF UNCERTAINTY: A ROAD MAP FOR UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL NEW
NORMAL (2018), https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/knowledge/society/our-age-of-uncertainty-presentation
(explaining public opinion research revealing alarming levels of distrust in institutions, growing numbers
of people who believe “the system is broken,” political tribalism, and changing demographics that have
all contributed to political breakdown); STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE
1–10 (2018) (outlining the eroding democratic norms in American society and how persistent threats to
institutions pave the path for autocrats to subvert democracy and oppress the people, as evidenced by
democracies around the world that have failed). As of this writing, there is no substantial research as to
whether President Biden’s nascent administration has been able to reverse any of these trends.
3
See Inaugural Address, 2021 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Jan. 20, 2021). President Biden
delivered his Inaugural Address, in which he promised to work “to restore the soul and to secure the
future of America,” at the U.S. Capitol only one week after “a riotous mob thought they could use
violence to silence the will of the people, to stop the work of our democracy, and to drive us from this
sacred ground.” Id. at 1–2. But see Charles Creitz, Hannity Pans Biden’s ‘Truly Unremarkable, Totally
Forgettable’ Inaugural Address, FOX NEWS (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.foxnews.com/media/seanhannity-reaction-biden-inaugural-address-radical-agenda (criticizing the Inaugural Address, Sean
Hannity, an influential conservative commentator and vocal supporter of President Trump, called
President Biden’s “unity” theme “laughable and completely disingenuous” because of Biden’s “radical”
agenda and unwillingness to “end[] the vitriol in his own party”).
4
LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 109–13 (identifying the judiciary as one of the “guardrails”
of democracy that maintain important democratic norms in constitutional systems where inherent gaps
threaten to undermine them).
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questions about its appropriateness in a branch that applies the law to “cases”
and “controversies” before it.5
When Alexander Hamilton wrote, in 1788, that the judiciary “will
always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution,” he
explicated the limited powers that the Constitution conferred upon the
courts.6 Practically, this means that judges must specifically identify the
constitutional authority that permits them to arrive at a conclusion. Formal
authority constrains judges and binds them to an ordained method for
applying the facts of any given case to the law. Authority also makes
outcomes more predictable and, crucially, reduces opportunities for rogue
judges to substitute personal opinions and agendas for neutral judgment.
But, strict adherence to formal authority must, at least occasionally, produce
inequitable, offensive, or otherwise unwanted outcomes. The risk remains
that those inequitable, offensive, or unfavorable outcomes will tarnish the
judiciary enough to impair its legitimacy as a democratic institution. As this
Note finds, illegitimate institutions present existential risks to democracy.
In American democracy, the fundamental answer to any question of
political authority is premised on the idea that the government derives its
power from the consent of the governed, so it follows that the American
judiciary does, as well.7 The legitimacy of the judicial branch as a
democratic institution requires that courts adhere to, and not transcend, the
powers outlined by the people. But, the Constitution is the product of thorny
compromises between competing eighteenth-century political factions,
which created latent ambiguities that lurk throughout the text.8 Justices who
improperly navigate constitutional ambiguities that involve the scope of
judicial authority can threaten the popular legitimacy of the institution
specifically and American democracy more broadly.
The mark of an institutionalist is the conscious aversion of outcomes
that present existential risks to the law and to legal systems.9 Of particular
interest to this Note is when judges pursue overarching commitments to
5
U.S. CONST. art. III; cf. Ilya Shapiro, Commentary, How the Supreme Court Undermines Its
Own Legitimacy, CATO INST. (July 18, 2019), https://www.cato.org/commentary/how-supreme-courtundermines-its-own-legitimacy (criticizing “cynical tactic[s]” of the American left who “work[] the
refs” by preying on the institutionalist sympathies of judges like Chief Justice Roberts because “it’s when
[J]ustices think about legitimacy that they act most illegitimately”).
6
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions,
will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a
capacity to annoy or injure them.”).
7
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
8
See Michael C. Dorf, The Coherentism of Democracy and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1237, 1251–53
(2005) (comparing constitutional interpretation to interpreting music given how ambiguities in the text
lend themselves to multiple competing interpretations).
9
See Mark A. Graber, Institutionalism as Conclusion and Approach, in RESEARCH METHODS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A HANDBOOK 6–7 (David Law & Malcolm Langford eds.) (forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3157358 (explaining that institutionalists are
united in their conclusions about the best way to organize the law and legal systems).
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ensure that the larger public and other branches of government perceive the
judiciary as a legitimate institution. Part I demonstrates that institutionalist
judges are animated by goals that are decidedly extralegal because they do
not necessarily derive from the legal texts that are being interpreted. Further,
the willingness of institutionalist judges to bypass formal legal analysis,
which is grounded in clear authority, demands an answer to the question:
where exactly do judges find the authority to determine which outcome
protects the legitimacy of the judiciary? In response, Part II constructs a
foundation for the constraint of institutionalist judges. Specifically, this Note
finds support for institutionalist decision-making within (1) cornerstone
principles of liberty inherent to the Constitution, (2) formal and informal
constraints on judicial power, and (3) the framers’ vision for the role of the
judiciary as a check on the political branches. Finally, Part III is motivated
by threats to institutions in the present watershed period of global democracy,
including the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, economic uncertainty, violent
societal unrest, political instability, and general questions about the ability of
the Constitution to address these crises. A central finding here is that
institutionalist judges, for better or for worse, can impact the legitimacy of
the democratic institutions that must hold firm against the rising tide
of authoritarianism.
This Note does not advocate for any approach to judging that bolsters
the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court. Though this Note
embraces important aspects of living constitutionalism, it proceeds beyond
the research of scholars who identify how living constitutionalism can solve
contemporary legal problems. In particular, this Note draws on lessons from
the presidency of Donald Trump, whose electoral appeal derived from his
eagerness to scrap unwritten rules and norms and to actively take steps to
weaken democratic institutions that interfered with his idiosyncratic brand
of populism. President Trump’s anti-democratic pathology climaxed in his
outrageous refusal to accept his loss in the 2020 election, then in his
incitement of the riotous insurrection at the U.S. Capitol that killed six
people in an attempt to overturn the election and prevent the peaceful
transfer of power.10 Finally, this Note implicitly contrasts institutionalism
10
See generally Select Committee Hearing: Hearing Before U.S. House Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong. (2022) (statement of Rep.
Bennie Thompson, Chairman, Select Comm. to Investigate the Jan. 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol)
(introducing the findings of the Select Committee that concluded that President Trump was at the center
of “a sprawling, multi-step conspiracy aimed at overturning the election” and “January 6 was the
culmination of an attempted coup”); Press Release, Sen. Mitt Romney, Romney Condemns Insurrection
at U.S. Capitol (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.romney.senate.gov/romney-condemns-insurrection-uscapitol (documenting Utah Republican and 2012 Republican presidential candidate Senator Mitt
Romney’s speech on the Senate floor once insurrectionists had been cleared from the Capitol). Senator
Romney stated, “We gather today due to a selfish man’s injured pride and the outrage of his supporters
whom he has deliberately misinformed for the past two months and stirred to action this very morning.
What happened here today was an insurrection, incited by the President of the United States.” Id. Senator
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with legal myopia that furthers partisan aims and results in self-inflicted
wounds for the judicial branch. Anti-institutionalism on the Supreme Court
reached a climax when the five dependably right-wing Justices overturned the
fifty-year-old Roe v. Wade11 precedent and eliminated the fundamental right
to choose an abortion.12 Prior to the publication of that decision—which was
rendered shortly before the publication of this Note—an early draft of the
majority opinion was inexplicably leaked to the press, which clearly
foreshadowed the demise of Roe and punctured new wounds into the Court’s
legitimacy.13 Speculation abounds regarding what precedent could be next on
the chopping block for the “newly constituted Court,” as Justice Sonia
Sotomayor acknowledged.14 Under these circumstances, this Note explains
why we allow institutionalist judging and how it has the capacity to further
democracy by tying judicial legitimacy to larger themes about global
institutional breakdown.
The tasks at hand are to challenge presumptions about institutionalism
and to look to constitutional law and universal democratic principles. The
chosen method is to examine institutionalism as a calling—a judicial
ethos—deriving authority from the spirit of the Constitution in order to
guard against anti-constitutional forces. We cannot be naïve. As the
character Octave complains in Jean Renoir’s 1939 film, The Rules of the
Game, “The awful thing about life is this: everybody has their reasons.”15
We must ensure that there are limits to when, how, and for what reasons
judges prioritize democratic legitimacy over strict interpretation of the law.
Romney also declared that those who refused to accept the results of a democratic election were
“complicit in an unprecedented attack against our democracy.” Id. Commentators took seriously
President Trump’s anti-democratic tendencies even prior to January 6, 2021. See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT,
supra note 2, at 176–203 (arguing that President Trump exhibited “authoritarian instincts” and outlining
instances in which he attempted to undermine democratic rules and norms by “capturing the referees,
sidelining the key players, and rewriting the rules to tilt the playing field against opponents”); Jonathan
Lemire, How Trump Has Rewritten the Rules of the Presidency, PBS (Dec. 27, 2018, 11:56 AM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/how-trump-has-rewritten-the-rules-of-the-presidency (finding
that President Trump rejected rules, norms, and traditions that restrained previous presidents and that
“Trump himself believes his unpredictability is what holds Americans’ attention and fuels his success”).
11
410 U.S. 110 (1973).
12
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., No. 19-1392 (U.S. June 24, 2022). The implications of
Dobbs, the opinion of which was officially released a week before this Note went to print, is beyond the
scope of this Note.
13
The Threat to Roe v. Wade and to the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy, CBS NEWS: SUNDAY
MORNING (May 8, 2022, 9:15 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/roe-v-wade-abortion-draftopinion-leak-supreme-court-legitimacy/ (quoting constitutional law expert Mary Ziegler’s remarks on
the magnitude of an opinion overruling Roe: “This will be something that professors of constitutional
law, and indeed professors of any kind of law, will be talking about, probably for more than 100 years
from this conversation”).
14
See, e.g., Egbert v. Boule, No. 21-147, slip op. at 14 (U.S. June 8, 2022) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“[A] restless and newly constituted Court sees fit to refashion the standard[s] anew to
foreclose remedies in yet more cases. . . . inconsistent with governing precedent.”).
15
THE RULES OF THE GAME (Nouvelles Éditions de Films 1939).
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I. RECOGNIZING THE INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH
The “institutionalist” label describes a judge’s attitude towards the
judiciary as an institution. It may not hint at that judge’s ideology. In common
parlance, there can be a tendency to use the term with a positive connotation.
For example, Supreme Court Justices are praised as “institutionalists” when
they defy prior expectations and side with ideological opposites on the Court
for a just cause.16 Yet, other commentators have used “institutionalist” as a
warning label to temper expectations and emphasize that a judge is not really
a convert to a cause, even if he delivers a victory for a particular side on a
particular occasion.17 Conceptually, there is an agreement that institutionalists
are “united by their conclusions about the law and legal systems rather than
by the methods they use to reach those conclusions.”18 But there is a problem
of identifying some consistency from case to case that demands a fuller
understanding of what we mean when we talk about institutionalism. In an
effort to determine some criteria, this Part begins by dissecting how judges
approach cases. For that, a brief review of the theories of judicial interpretation
is in order to first develop a contrast for institutionalism.
A. How Judges Make Decisions
All judges, including institutionalist ones, make choices about the law
based on the facts at bar, so understanding institutionalism begins with
understanding how judges approach the most significant aspect of their jobs:
making decisions. We want to know—and our constitutional republic
requires—that judges make decisions that (1) are not arbitrary and (2) are
rooted in clear authority within the Constitution, an Act of Congress, or
another source of law. Scrutinizing judicial decision-making helps to

16
See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, John Roberts Is Just Who the Supreme Court Needed, ATLANTIC,
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/john-roberts-just-who-supreme-court-needed/614053/
(July 14, 2020, 12:56 PM) (“[Chief Justice] Roberts said he would try to persuade his colleagues to put
institutional legitimacy first by encouraging them to converge around narrow, bipartisan decisions to avoid
5-4 partisan splits.”); Jamie Crooks & Samir Deger-Sen, Opinion, We Were Clerks at the Supreme Court.
Its Legitimacy Is Now in Question., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/25/
opinion/supreme-court-amy-coney-barrett.html (explaining that the authors opposed Amy Coney Barrett’s
nomination to the Supreme Court not because they are “liberals” who disagree with her originalist
methodology, but rather because they are “institutionalists” who are concerned that “the [C]ourt’s decisions
won’t be accepted” if multiple Justices are viewed as occupying stolen seats).
17
See, e.g., Maya Manian, Winning by Losing: Chief Justice Roberts’s Strategy to Eviscerate
Reproductive Rights and Justice, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV . (Aug. 10, 2020), https://harvardlpr.com/2
020/08/10/winning-by-losing-chief-justice-robertss-strategy-to-eviscerate-reproductive-rights-and-justi
ce/ (outlining the possible duplicity of institutionalism, specifically in how Chief Justice Roberts decides
cases). Manian argues that “Roberts voted with the liberal bloc [in June Medical Services v. Russo] to
protect the legitimacy of the Supreme Court while still advancing a doctrinal agenda that will dismantle
reproductive rights.” Id.
18
Graber, supra note 9, at 3.
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demystify the misleadingly straightforward notion that judges merely apply
facts to law.
Because of that need for accessibility and accountability, a set of
theories for interpreting the Constitution emerged. The Constitution is a
legal document that features numerous textual ambiguities, which the
framers did with the purpose of providing a degree of flexibility to future
generations who would apply it to modern cases and controversies.19 Phillip
Bobbitt described approaches for interpreting these ambiguities as
“constitutional modalities,” which provide “ways in which legal propositions
are characterized as true from a constitutional point of view.”20 In Bobbitt’s
modalities framework, there are six categories of sound arguments that judges
can deploy to determine the answer to a legal question in light of the
constitutional ambiguities: (1) the historical; (2) the textual; (3) those making
structural inferences; (4) the doctrinal, looking to prior precedent; (5) the
ethical, looking to rules derived from “moral commitments of the American
ethos that are reflected in the Constitution;” and (6) the prudential, which
“balance[s] the costs and benefits of a particular rule.”21 These
classifications provide fundamental principles for competing visions of
judicial decision-making.22 While it is possible that certain considerations
might be excluded, the categories help to “test the legitimacy of constitutional
arguments.”23 To answer constitutional questions, judges may deploy
multiple interpretive approaches that overlap and mesh together, or they may
use the facts to highlight flaws in competing approaches. Thus, the viability
of each approach means that judges have a wide latitude to confront
constitutional questions and retain legitimacy. Bobbitt’s framework will aid
our search for an institutionalist approach to constitutional interpretation, but
institutionalism does not fit neatly into any of his modalities.
For example, consider a legal analysis that falls squarely into a formalist,
or non-consequentialist,24 category. Justice Antonin Scalia spent multiple
19
See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (addressing the inherent ambiguity of
the Tenth Amendment, Justice Holmes explains that “[w]ith regard to that we may add that when we are
dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must
realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen
completely by the most gifted of its begetters”).
20
PHILIP CHASE BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12 (1991).
21
Id. at 12–13.
22
See id. at 22 (clarifying that his proposed modalities can be used to construct a series of
competing political ideologies, but “they need only stand alone to provide the means for making
constitutional argument”).
23
André LeDuc, The Anti-Foundational Challenge to the Philosophical Premises of the Debate
Over Originalism, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 131, 141 n.33 (2014).
24
Nonconsequentialism, generally, “denies that the rightness or wrongness of our conduct is
determined solely by the goodness or badness of the consequences.” Note, Rights in Flux:
Nonconsequentialism, Consequentialism, and the Judicial Role, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1439 (2017)
(citation omitted).
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paragraphs of his majority opinion in Crawford v. Washington detailing
the legal evolution of the Confrontation Clause, allowing us to safely
categorize his analysis into the “historical” modality and see that he was less
focused on the rightness or wrongness of the conduct at issue.26 In Crawford,
Justice Scalia tracked the right to confront one’s accusers in a court of law
from its origins “back [in] Roman times” up through its adoption into
English common law, codification under Queen Mary I, and inclusion into
the Bill of Rights.27 Reframing the Confrontation Clause as intended to
prohibit “trial by affidavit,” the Crawford Court held that the Confrontation
Clause excludes hearsay evidence that is “testimonial” in nature.28 Justice
Scalia drew on other modalities, but his logic is grounded in the text of the
Confrontation Clause, and he claims unambiguous authority in the intentions
of the framers in including the Sixth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.
Looking to the formalism in Crawford is helpful because it demonstrates an
approach to judging that appeals to formal authority as opposed to wrangling
with issues of workability.
B. Thinking About Other Reasons to Decide a Case
Unlike formalism, the institutionalism discussed in this Note defies
clean categorization into one constitutional modality—partly because it is
more accurate to characterize a judge as an institutionalist, as opposed to his
constitutional analysis. As we examine the institutionalist approach, we look
at cases where a Supreme Court Justice could fit into the institutionalist
mold. We look at instances in which a Justice justifies a move away from a
particular methodological or consequentialist approach and, instead, moves
toward an analysis with extralegal considerations. From this angle, we see
institutionalist choices that better insulate the Court from public backlash,
reinforce the neutrality of the Court, or appeal to larger moral truths.
1. Optics: Protecting the Reputation of the Court
The first extralegal consideration to study is the optics of a judicial
decision—specifically, how the opinion of the legal community and the
public influences how a Justice approaches a case. Optical considerations
are a logical place to start for three reasons. First, because a concern for the
25

541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 36–37; see also BOBBITT, supra note 20, at 13 (“Historical, or ‘originalist’ approaches to
construing the text . . . are distinctive in their reference back to what a particular provision is thought to
have meant to its ratifiers.”).
27
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. Because the Sixth Amendment merited inclusion in the Bill of Rights,
which protects citizens from government abuse, Justice Scalia reasons that the Framers must have
contemplated a contemporary, odious practice inflicted upon colonists by the British Crown—prosecuting
individuals based on evidence that consisted of written affidavits of their supposed wrongdoing. Id. at
50–51.
28
Id. at 53.
26
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Court’s reputation has no basis in written law, a formalist would not spend
time caring about the optics of his decision. Second, Chief Justice Roberts’
2020 “switch” on abortion restrictions has been roundly described as an
example of his institutionalism because of the consequences that upholding
the abortion restriction statute could have for the public reputation of the
Court.29 Third, Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion in June Medical
Services L.L.C. v. Russo30 evidences why there is a hazy understanding
of the makings of an institutionalist approach, especially because
optical considerations are only discernable in the context in which the case
was decided.
Chief Justice Roberts, appointed by Republican President George W.
Bush, issued largely predictable conservative decisions for much of his
tenure, although observers have noted his growing willingness to side with
the Court’s liberals.31 This inclination has increased since the retirement of
resident “swing” Justice Anthony Kennedy in 2018 and Justice Brett
Kavanaugh’s subsequent confirmation, which tinted the Court with a clear
5-4 majority.32 Among the most prominent immediate repercussions was the
potential that the reinforced conservative majority would overturn or scale
down the central holding of Roe v. Wade: that the right to terminate a
pregnancy was a fundamental constitutional right.33 Indeed, anti-abortion
activists swiftly schemed to capitalize on Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation.34
By litigating a new restrictive abortion statute that was substantially similar to
one that the Court had struck down while Justice Kennedy was still on the
bench, there was an opportunity to rewrite history with a more friendly
Justice.35 But instead, Chief Justice Roberts voted with the Court’s liberals in
29

See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Upholding Precedent While Rewriting It in June Medical Services v.
Russo, BILL OF HEALTH (July 17, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/17/precedentabortion-stare-decisis-supreme-court/ (noting that Chief Justice Roberts has been described as an
“institutionalist” and that “June Medical illuminates how Roberts may be able to make his opinions
backlash-proof”); Sonia Suter, Opinion, New Abortion Laws May Save Roe v. Wade, BALT. SUN (May
31, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-op-0602-abortion-scotus20190530-story.html (“Because Chief Justice John Roberts is an institutionalist . . . he cannot be eager
for the court to consider the constitutionality of statutes . . . [that] thumb their noses at precedent that has
stood for nearly half a century . . . .”); Margaret Talbot, Possible Responses to the Major Abortion Case
Before the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dailycomment/possible-responses-to-the-major-abortion-case-before-the-supreme-court (explaining that,
before the ruling was handed down, abortion rights activists could only hope that “[Chief] Justice Roberts’s
institutionalism will kick in” and uphold the prior precedent striking down similar abortion restrictions).
30
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
31
Rosen, supra note 16.
32
Id.
33
See generally id.; Ian Millhiser & Anna North, The Supreme Court Case that Could Dismantle Roe
v. Wade, Explained, VOX, https://www.vox.com/2019/10/4/20874618/roe-wade-supreme-court-louisianaabortion-gee (Jan. 22, 2020, 10:53 AM).
34
Id.
35
Id.
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holding that the “almost word-for-word identical” Louisiana abortion statute
was unconstitutional based on the earlier precedent. 36 Because Chief Justice
Roberts had dissented in a case that dealt with an “almost word-for-word
identical” statute four years earlier, an analysis of his concurring opinion in
June Medical Services could, in theory, help unpack his institutionalism.
But institutionalist reasoning is elusive in written opinions. To wit, Chief
Justice Roberts begins his June Medical Services opinion with lofty
quotations from W. Blackstone, Edmund Burke, and Alexander Hamilton as
authorities extolling the importance of stare decisis.37 In a decision that he
writes as though it were preordained, Chief Justice Roberts rests his
conclusion on strict adherence to Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,38
the recent precedent that the Louisiana abortion statute is an undue burden
to a woman’s right to seek an abortion.39 Clarifying that he “continue[s] to
believe that [Whole Woman’s Health] was wrongly decided,” he defends his
refusal to correct the mistake by writing, “[a]dherence to precedent is
necessary to ‘avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts.’”40 Chief Justice
Roberts makes clear that he agrees with the reasoning of the plurality that
“Casey’s requirement of finding a substantial obstacle before invalidating
an abortion regulation is therefore a sufficient basis for the decision, as it
was in Whole Woman’s Health.”41 However, Chief Justice Roberts does not
express a concern for the reproductive rights of Louisiana women at any
point, and he ultimately rejects the plurality’s opinion fortifying the undue
burden balancing test for protecting abortion rights.42
Here, institutionalism surfaces somewhere in Chief Justice Roberts’s
ultimate decision that the optics of the Court reaching an opposite conclusion
in 2020 were unfavorable, even though his position on the merits may not
have changed. If anti-abortion activists can take obvious steps to manipulate
judicial precedent—by campaigning for an openly pro-life President,
publicly supporting his judicial nominees through two historically
contentious confirmation hearings, and strategically litigating an abortion
restriction statute that directly challenges a previous Court ruling—it
undoubtedly would have instigated a debate about the Roberts Court’s

36

June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112 (2020).
Id. at 2134–35 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
38
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). An abortion restriction substantially similar to that in June Medical
Services was invalidated by the Court in Whole Woman’s Health. Id.
39
June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2134–35 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
40
Id. at 2133–34 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
41
Id. at 2139 (relying on Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), for discussion).
42
Some commentators have argued that Chief Justice Roberts actually undermined abortion rights
by rejecting a balancing test and asking “only whether the burdens imposed by an abortion regulation
amount to a substantial obstacle to accessing abortion care.” Manian, supra note 17.
37
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partiality and respect for precedent. Further, the Court faced the unseemly
prospect of five men exercising significant power over a hot-button
women’s health issue, with two of those men (Justices Kavanaugh and
Gorsuch) having been nominated by a white, male President who lost the
popular vote and made a campaign promise that he would present judicial
nominees who would “automatically” overturn Roe v. Wade.44 Chief Justice
Roberts’ switch prevented widespread condemnation of the Court on these
grounds and demonstrated that the Supreme Court would not function as an
extension of the Republican Party.45 In light of these optical considerations,
as opposed to individual legal conclusions, Chief Justice Roberts’ decision
is characterized as “institutionalist.”
2. Competitive Balance: Delivering Wins for Both Political Parties
An essential element of the institutionalist ethos is judicial recognition
that organized political interests wage war in court. It accepts that, in
America’s competitive two-party system, one party can gain a major
advantage over the other by “winning” in court. With partisan judicial battle
in mind, Professor Zachary Price advocates for courts adopting an ethos of
“symmetric constitutionalism.”46 Constitutional symmetry principles
instruct that courts should, “when possible, favor outcomes, doctrines, and
rationales that distribute benefits across the country’s major ideological
divides.”47 The rationale for this conclusory approach is that it promotes
equal outcomes among America’s competing political factions.48 By
grounding decisions in rules that give both parties a chance to “win” in court,
the judiciary maintains its institutional legitimacy across the political
spectrum when public opinion is strongly polarized.49 Like institutionalists,
then, judges who adopt symmetric constitutionalism are freed from the
mandates of any particular approach that could lead to disturbing outcomes
or could unduly inflame partisan passions.
43
Caitlin Moscatello, Will the Supreme Court Strike a Devastating Blow to Abortion Rights?, CUT
(June 17, 2020), https://www.thecut.com/2020/06/supreme-court-case-june-medical-v-russo-may-changeabortion.html.
44
See generally id. (“Not only will the Court’s decision disproportionately impact low-income
women, who may lack the means to travel out of state for care, but Black women. Due to an intersection
of factors, including discrimination within the health-care system and lack of access to affordable, quality
care, Black women terminate pregnancies at higher rates than white and Hispanic women.”).
45
Cf. Manian, supra note 17 (concluding that “Chief Justice Roberts set forth a strategy for winning
the war against reproductive rights”).
46
See Zachary S. Price, Symmetric Constitutionalism: An Essay on Masterpiece Cakeshop and the
Post-Kennedy Supreme Court, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1273, 1274–75 (2019) (arguing for an approach to the
law that responds to the partisan divide by leaving room for judicial discretion and allowing courts to
moderate competition between “competing partisan visions”).
47
Id. at 1278.
48
Id. at 1275.
49
Id. at 1283.
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Symmetric constitutionalism may help explain the outcome of National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius50—another case that
bolstered Chief Justice Roberts’ reputation as an institutionalist.51 Here,
Chief Justice Roberts writes for the Court that the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’ power
to tax.52 The Court held that the ACA—a federal law that expands access to
health insurance by requiring Americans who do not “maintain minimum
essential health insurance coverage” to make a “shared responsibility
payment to the Federal Government”—is not a “penalty,” as it had been
characterized, but it is rather a “tax incentive” created by Congress. 53
In his analysis, Chief Justice Roberts genuflected at the altars of
textualism,54 structuralism,55 and doctrinalism.56 Notably, his analysis
deviated sharply from that of the four conservative dissenters, who wrote
that the government had not sufficiently briefed or argued the issue of
whether the sanction, if it was a tax, was a direct one.57 In response, Chief
Justice Roberts detoured from his constitutional analysis to counter his
ideological brethren’s argument that “we cannot uphold § 5000A as a tax
because Congress did not ‘frame’ it as such,” by determining that Congress
had merely mislabeled the “practical effect” of the Act.58 Perhaps Chief
Justice Roberts was nodding to institutionalist imperatives by referencing
Chief Justice John Marshall and foundational principles of judicial review.
Citing Chief Justice Marshall’s landmark McCulloch v. Maryland opinion
as “background” to the case at bar, Chief Justice Roberts exalted the weight
of deciding the constitutionality of the ACA.59 Ultimately, Chief Justice
Roberts disguised any possible consequentialism about a potential health
insurance crisis. His analysis is grounded in constitutional law, and it pushes

50

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 669 (2012).
See, e.g., Gillian Metzger, John Roberts the Institutionalist?, TAKE CARE (June 22, 2019),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/john-roberts-the-institutionalist (examining the claim that Chief Justice
Roberts is an “institutionalist” for his opinions in cases like Sebelius).
52
Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 574.
53
Id. at 539, 572.
54
See id. at 563 (“[T]he mandate can be regarded as establishing a condition—not owning health
insurance—that triggers a tax—the required payment to the IRS.”).
55
See id. at 566 (“[T]he payment is collected solely by the IRS through the normal means of
taxation . . . .”).
56
See id. (“The reasons the Court in Drexel Furniture held that what was called a ‘tax’ there was a
penalty support the conclusion that what is called a ‘penalty’ here may be viewed as a tax.”).
57
Id. at 669 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined Justice Scalia’s
dissent. Id. at 646.
58
Id. at 569–70 (majority opinion).
59
Id. at 533–34, 538 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 , 405 (1819)); see also
JOAN BISKUPIC, THE CHIEF: THE LIFE AND TURBULENT TIMES OF CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS 9–10
(2019) (quoting Chief Justice Roberts on his desire to be remembered more like Chief Justice John
Marshall than Chief Justice Roger Taney).
51
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back against the dissent’s criticism. Chief Justice Roberts made no appeals
to the far-reaching consequences of striking down the ACA, which offered
a way for millions of Americans to access healthcare. Here, as in June
Medical Services, it is more illuminating to examine the circumstances
surrounding the result in Sebelius. Given what we know about Chief Justice
Roberts, it is reasonable to believe that he changed his vote in response to
growing concerns that the Court exercised unchecked power in support of
conservative causes.61 Specifically, the critical question is how the political
sectarianism, intensified during the Obama administration, prompted Chief
Justice Roberts to switch his position on the ACA and to uphold the law.
At the time of the Sebelius decision, the ACA represented the signature
legislative achievement of the Democratic administration of President Barack
Obama, the first Black President of the United States, whose name became a
shorthand for the law that expanded healthcare coverage for millions of
Americans. Only two years prior, the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down
parts of a federal campaign finance reform law in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission62 infuriated liberals and raised the ire of President
Obama himself, who rebuked the ruling in his 2010 State of the Union
Address.63 Further, before the Court’s decision on Sebelius, President Obama
condemned, in no uncertain terms, that he felt such a decision would be an
“unprecedented, extraordinary step of overturning a law that was passed by a
strong majority of a democratically elected Congress.”64
Meanwhile, Chief Justice Roberts had been clearly aggravated by
President Obama’s accusations that the Court served conservative
interests.65 Over the course of several months from late 2011 through early
2012, Chief Justice Roberts felt compelled to return to an argument that,
seemingly, the government had not fully developed—that the individual

60
BISKUPIC, supra note 59, at 236, 238 (discussing the impact of conversations that Chief Justice
Roberts had with Justice Kennedy, in which Justice Kennedy shared that he believed that the
unconstitutionality of the individual mandate required the Court to invalidate the entire ACA).
61
Id. at 10.
62
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
63
See Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 8 (Jan. 27, 2010) (criticizing the Supreme Court for granting “the special interests and their lobbyists
even more power in Washington”); David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbyists Get Potent Weapon in Campaign
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22donate.html
(explaining that the decision ignored the economic recession that hurt many Americans and would largely
benefit Republicans, who are “the traditional allies of big corporations, who have more money to spend
than unions”).
64
See President Barack Obama, President Felipe Calderón & Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Joint
Press Conf. (Apr. 2, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/02/jointpress-conference-president-obama-president-calderon-mexico-and-pri (responding to a reporter’s
question about the upcoming Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of the individual mandate).
65
Bill Mears, Chief Justice Chides State of the Union as ‘Political Pep Rally’, CNN (Mar. 11, 2010,
7:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/03/10/obama.supremecourt/index.html.
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mandate was a constitutional exercise of Congress’ taxing power. Striking
down the ACA would have led—at least superficially—to an asymmetric
result that tilted the Supreme Court’s “outcomes, doctrines, and rationales” in
favor of the Republicans.67 Given the stakes of the case and the President’s
open admonishment of the Court’s motivations, the opposite result could have
made the Court out to be a loaded weapon in the arsenal of conservatives.
3. Rights and Wrongs: Making Sense of Substantive Due Process and
Universality
Another aim of an institutionalist judge might be to secure a result that
respects particular moral or ethical values as a means of preserving the
Court’s legitimacy. In other words, an institutionalist might strive to
enumerate unenumerated principles that seem important in a democratic
system of government and to steer outcomes to match them. For example,
Griswold v. Connecticut68 announced a general right to privacy that
emanates from the Bill of Rights, thus tracking evolving values of sexual
freedom in the 1960s and standing for the belief that the government should
not meddle in the bedroom of an opposite-sex married couple.69 Judges
wield imposing power over the lives of others. In court, personal health,
financial security, and freedom from incarceration may be on the line.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo recognized room for appealing to moral truths in
writing that “[t]he final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that
misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence.”70 Given the gravity
of a court’s decisions, then, judges may tap into their moral intuitions,
without straying too far from the boundaries of the law, to achieve outcomes
that are deemed more conscionable. But the search for moral truth and the
search for legal truth are different beasts, and there exists a degree of
aversion to the idea that judges should insert their own moral judgments into
the law—even to avoid morally unconscionable results.71
66

BISKUPIC, supra note 59, at 238; cf. Jack M. Balkin, Tax Power: The Little Argument That Could,
CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2012/06/28/opinion/balkin-health-care/index.html (June 30, 2012, 10:21
AM) (explaining that the crux of the government’s argument was that the individual mandate was valid
under the Commerce Clause, but noting that “[Solicitor General Donald B.] Verrilli had quietly beefed
up the tax power arguments in his final brief before the Supreme Court”); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 669 (2012) (Scalia, J. et al., dissenting) (pointing out that the government
had failed to develop the taxing power argument in great enough depth and that the Court needed
“more than a fly-by-night briefing and argument before deciding a difficult constitutional question of
first impression”).
67
Price, supra note 46, at 1280.
68
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
69
Id. at 484–85. See Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 103–04
(2018) (explaining the Supreme Court’s announcement of a right to privacy as a byproduct of changing
sexual mores of the 1960s).
70
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921).
71
See LeDuc supra note 23, at 134–35, 135 n.13 (explaining a theory of constitutional law that is
predicated on fundamental truths held by our society and listing sources that warn against this approach);
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A central debate in this area focuses on the power of judges to right moral
wrongs in society and judges’ deployment of this power. In constitutional law,
substantive due process—in which litigants can demonstrate that an activity
unenumerated in the Constitution implicates a fundamental right—is ripe for
institutionalists to incorporate moral truths that seem important to American
democracy.72 Because of the subjectiveness of substantive due process,
though, the workability of moral considerations in legal analysis has prompted
debates over whether fundamental rights “trump” other important interests
or if fundamental rights should be balanced against “mere” interests.73
Professor Jamal Greene finds that a consistent problem in deciding that a
fundamental right trumps other interests is that it presents a binary rhetorical
question about which party has a right that is worthy of vindication, which
puts undue pressure on the question of whether a right is actually at stake.74
When courts probe how far a right should extend, Greene submits, it creates
a “world of enemies” in which “[t]he government’s claim is necessarily that
the rights-bearer is wholly beneath constitutional concern, and the
rights-bearer’s claim is that the government is a bad actor and not just a
clumsy one.”75 This type of war over rights and moral truths risks cheapening
cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 620, 634–35 (1996) (concluding that a Colorado constitutional
amendment denying “special rights” to gays and lesbians was motivated by “animosity toward the class
of persons affected”); id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Colorado amendment was not
motivated by “animus,” but by “moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral
disapproval that produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional”).
72
The fundamental rights analysis is flexible by nature, and the Supreme Court has used a balancing
approach to determine whether to create one for an activity. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223–24
(1982) (balancing a child’s right to public education against its “costs to the Nation”); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (balancing a woman’s right to terminate a
pregnancy against “the interest of the State in the protection of potential life”); Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (balancing an unmarried biological parent’s right to establish paternity rights
to his child against the rights of a marital parent to protect his family).
73
Compare RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 10 (Bloomsbury Acad. ed. 2013)
(1977) (arguing that rights are trump cards and that to subject fundamental rights to a balancing test is to
deny them altogether), with Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1379–82
(1990) (advocating for a pragmatic approach to constitutional interpretation that weighs the various legal
and moral consequences of a decision).
74
Greene, supra note 69, at 65–67. Greene illustrates the rhetorical problem of the rights-as-trumps
approach by highlighting how opposing litigants came to the Supreme Court armed with absolutist
conclusions about the extent of their rights in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). Greene, supra note 69, at 31–32. Greene observes that “one
consequence of rarely subjecting rights to balancing is that the rights themselves must be articulated with
care and specificity. The line demarcating those who hold rights and those who do not becomes a
momentous one . . . .” Id. at 32. Greene does not necessarily dispute Dworkin’s framing of the nature of
rights but rather how courts apply it. Id.; see also id. at 32–33 (“Less momentous cases sit uneasily within
a rights-as-trumps frame. The frame induces our identification of rights to track the categories judges are
able to access, articulate, and delimit rather than the moral, political, or even constitutional justice the
rights mean to promote. And so Americans have a right to market pharmaceuticals to doctors or to parlay
the corporate form into electioneering expenditures, both of which the Court categorizes as ‘speech,’ but no
federal constitutional right to food, shelter, or education, which are harder to corral.”) (citations omitted).
75
Id. at 65.
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the protection of rights to the point that they can be denied in cases
where they are needed most.76 Yet, Greene also expresses concern that
proportionality—which he argues is a more favorable alternative to rights as
trumps—can fail to distinguish rights from mere interests.77 The crux of
Greene’s appeal—for courts to take rights “reasonably” instead of taking
one side of absolutist partisan battles—seems to require a kind of
institutionalist mindset that reimagines how courts approach fundamental
rights. Changing how rights are created and examined demands some
flexibility and prudence, as discussed in this subpart, and it seems clear that
doing so involves moral judgment.
Understanding our wars over rights relates to collective intuitions about
the unassailable correctness of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka.78 The universal assessment that Brown is
undeniably correct interacts with the emerging agreement that segregating
schoolchildren by race was unconscionable and that the Court did right by
the country when it finally ended a longstanding injustice. But, really, this
intuition reflects more about the moral truth of the wrongness of segregation
in a democratic polity than it does about sound constitutional analysis.79
First, the Plessy v. Ferguson80 precedent restrained the Warren Court’s
authority to end legal segregation. “Separate but equal” represented the 8-1
judgment of the 1896 Court, and several states relied on Plessy for their
existing legal structures. In striking down school segregation laws, the
Warren Court decided to override stare decisis, and it unanimously held that
Plessy was wrongfully decided.81 Second, in 1954, it could not be seriously
contended that the “history and traditions” of the United States did not
include racial discrimination and white supremacy.82 It would have required
76

Id. at 37.
See id. at 87–89 (explaining the common criticism of proportionality, which is that judges, whose
backgrounds are in legal analysis, are not ideal candidates for distinguishing rights from interests).
Greene advocates instead for a more mechanical approach to adjudication that reserves the balancing of
interests for the final stage of analysis. Id.
78
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that segregation of children in public schools on the basis of
race deprives children of the minority group equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth
Amendment). See, e.g., LeDuc, supra note 23, at 185 (explaining that, in constitutional law, there is
virtual unanimity in the community that Brown is a better interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
than Plessy); Posner, supra note 73, at 1374 (“No constitutional theory that implies that Brown v. Board
of Education . . . was decided incorrectly will receive a fair hearing nowadays . . . .”).
79
See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 381–82 (2011) (explaining that Brown
“was in tension with the original expected application of the Fourteenth Amendment, was not compelled
by the text of the Equal Protection Clause, and has required a Herculean effort—one well beyond the
Court’s competence—to implement comprehensively”) (citations omitted).
80
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
81
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95.
82
See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1857) (concluding that Black descendants
of slaves were never intended to be included as “citizens” under the Constitution). The Dred Scott Court
found that enslaved people “were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings,
77
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a strained interpretation of the history of racism for the Court to contend that
Jim Crow laws violated some fundamental right of people of color in the
United States to experience equal treatment or for their children to learn
alongside white children. Rather, the Brown Court determined that (1)
outlawing segregated education is consistent with the intent of the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment, even if they did not specifically intend for it;83
(2) education held a special status in society, and segregation generated a
stigmatic “feeling of inferiority” among Black students;84 and (3) social
science suggested that legal segregation hurt “the educational and mental
development” of Black students.85 The result was the beginning of the end for
de jure segregation, and it represented an important moral step in addressing
systematic racism and the legacy of racial slavery in American history.86
An unanswered question after Brown was how to reconcile the sweeping
impact of ending legal segregation with the traditional role of the courts.
Prioritizing moral vindication over answering thorny legal questions left it
up to the political branches of government to decide. Yet, Brown endures as
a landmark case that advanced the civil rights of Black Americans. In a few
pages of a written opinion, the Supreme Court openly appealed to a moral
truth—that subjecting children to legal segregation is wrong. By refining a
universal democratic principle and unilaterally righting one of the most
fundamental wrongs in American history, Brown and the subsequent
dismantling of Jim Crow laws bolstered the institutional reputation of
the Court.
C. Bad Judgment: The Anti-Canon & the Price of Consequentialism
Judges earn an “institutionalist” badge by appealing to lofty policy
who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject
to their authority.” Id. As evidence for this claim, the Court pointed to “the public history of every
European nation” and that the inferiority of the Black race was “at that time fixed and universal in the
civilized portion of the white race.” Id. at 407. See generally Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations,
ATLANTIC (June 15, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-forreparations/361631/ (explaining how the legacy of racial slavery and anti-Black racism in the United
States leaves an enduring mark on communities of color).
83
Brown, 347 U.S. at 489–90.
84
Id. at 494.
85
Id.
86
Reflecting on the importance of Brown, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. said:
To all men of goodwill, this decision came as a joyous daybreak to end the long night
of human captivity. It came as a great beacon light of hope to millions of colored
people throughout the world who had had a dim vision of the promised land of
freedom and justice. It was a reaffirmation of the good old American doctrine of
freedom and equality for all men. And this decision came as a legal and sociological
deathblow to an evil that had occupied the throne of American life for several decades.
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Desegregation and the Future, Address Delivered at the Annual Luncheon
of the National Committee for Rural Schools (Dec. 15, 1956).
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goals. But, after discussing the merits of extralegal considerations, this Note
must address the elephant in the courtroom: that extralegal considerations
come with clear risks, mainly the risk that a judge, despite (or perhaps
because of) his lifetime of legal experience, will occasionally make a bad
judgment. Supreme Court history shows that mere mistakes in legal
analysis,87 lack of foresight about consequences,88 or bare unscrupulous
intentions89 can impair the decision-making of a judge as much as any other
human. A judicial system that cannot or will not constrain judges from
wielding the sword of institutionalism to steer outcomes of important cases
must occasionally confront the aftershocks of bad judgments.
One case that illustrates the pitfalls of extralegal considerations and,
arguably, the risks inherent in deciding cases with an eye towards preserving
institutional legitimacy is Korematsu v. United States.90 This is clearly an
ignominious example; Korematsu is an undisputed addition to what scholars
have called the “anti-canon” of constitutional cases, meaning “the set of legal
materials so wrongly decided that their errors . . . we would not willingly let
die” in spite of no longer being good law.91
Korematsu’s most condemnable feature is the Court’s approval of
87
See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191–92 (1986) (holding that the Court would not
“announce . . . a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy” because it is “obvious” that
“consensual sodomy” among LGBTQ people is neither “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” nor
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”) (citations omitted). Justice Harry Blackmun chided
the majority for its “obsessive focus on homosexual activity” in his dissent. Id. at 200 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Bowers was overruled only seventeen years later as “not correct when it was decided, and it
is not correct today.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); see also Greene, supra note 79, at
432–33 (“The analytic problems of the Bowers majority opinion appear almost willful.”).
88
See, e.g., Justin Sink, O’Connor Worries Supreme Court Was Wrong to Rule in Bush v. Gore,
HILL (Apr. 29, 2013, 3:09 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/296681-oconnorsupreme-court-may-have-erred-in-considering-bush-v-gore (reporting on comments made by Justice
O’Connor in an interview in which she expressed regret about taking the case because it was a major
election issue, evidence suggested that Florida election authorities made serious mistakes, and the
decision “gave the court a less-than-perfect reputation”).
89
See, e.g., Ian Millhiser, INJUSTICES: THE SUPREME COURT’S HISTORY OF COMFORTING THE
COMFORTABLE AND AFFLICTING THE AFFLICTED 77–79 (2015) (recounting the egotism, bigotry,
anti-Semitism, and misogyny displayed by Justice James Clark McReynolds, including incidents in
which he referred to President Franklin Roosevelt as “that crippled son-of-a-bitch . . . in the White
House,” refused to speak to Justice Louis Brandeis for three years because Brandeis was Jewish,
exclaimed, “I see the female is here” and left the courtroom on the rare occasion a woman argued a case
before the Supreme Court, and “turned his back on the courtroom” when a Black advocate argued a case
in front of the Court). Millhiser wrote, “McReynolds was lazy. He often would not even open the briefs
lawyers filed to prepare him to hear a case until hours before the case was argued, and he frequently spent
just a few hours crafting opinions that would govern all other courts in the country.” Id. Though Justice
McReynolds’ legal conclusions do not necessarily reveal his bigotry, laziness and personal animus have
to cast doubt on the wisdom of his judgements, and it seems important for a judicial system to constrain
judges like him.
90
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
91
Greene, supra note 79, at 386. Korematsu was condemned as “gravely wrong” and “overruled in
the court of history” in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
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sweeping racial profiling against Japanese Americans to validate a
misguided internment policy that was based on faulty logic and naked
racism.92 Further, as Justice Jackson contended in his dissenting opinion, the
evacuation and internment order was a flagrant violation of due process, and
“a judicial construction that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow
to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself . . . .”93 But, for the
Korematsu majority, the “military urgency of the situation” on the West
Coast in the early years of the Pacific War provided a compelling
governmental interest for the race-based exclusionary order.94 The Court
refused to query the findings brought forward by the military, however
suspect or unfounded,95 that at least some Japanese Americans pledged
allegiance to the Japanese Emperor and that this imperiled U.S. national
security interests.96 In spite of the clear constitutional violations at stake, the
Court was too bashful to deride a judgment of the military and the popular
President Roosevelt during the waning days of World War II. It is possible
to recognize the wrongness of the decision while having sympathy for the
uncomfortable position in which the Court found (or placed) itself. As
Justices on the Korematsu Court expressed in later years, it felt awkward for
an unelected group of legal experts to debate military necessity with the
lionized forces who had achieved an Allied victory in World War II.97 This
extraordinary deference to the executive branch and the military reveals an
overarching concern regarding the ramifications of a decision that came out
the opposite way. In 1944, the Court made a judgment that it, as an
institution, must not appear uncommitted to an American victory in World
War II. Thus, for reasons that were decidedly extralegal, the Court charted a
path that clashed the least with a military prerogative. Regrettably, that path
92
Greene, supra note 79, at 423. For a fuller understanding of Korematsu among the injustices
committed by the American government against Japanese Americans during World War II, see, e.g.,
ERIC L. MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR COUNTRY: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN DRAFT
RESISTERS IN WORLD WAR II xiii-xv (2001).
93
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245–46 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also id. at 246 (explaining that the
military’s reasons for an unconstitutional order, no matter how compelling, should never receive
validation from the Court, lest the precedent “lie[] about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need”).
94
Id. at 223 (majority opinion).
95
In 1984, a federal district court overturned Korematsu’s conviction on the ground that the
government had “knowingly withheld information from the courts when they were considering the
critical question of military necessity.” Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417 (N.D. Cal.
1984). Four years later, Congress passed legislation acknowledging “the fundamental injustice” of the
forced evacuation and allowed reparations for individuals forced out of their homes. An Act to Implement
Recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Pub. L. No.
100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988).
96
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
97
See Greene, supra note 79, at 458 (excerpting a passage from Justice William O. Douglas’ book
in which he expresses regret for joining the Korematsu majority, but suggests that the terrifying stakes
that the government presented to the Court could have imperiled the legitimacy of the Court).
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meant that the Court used its institutional clout to approve a racist
governmental action.98
Further, other cases that have been permanently placed in the anti-canon
have made improper appeals to extralegal considerations when members
believed that they needed to bolster the Court’s institutional reputation.
Greene reviews the primary criticisms targeted at Dred Scott v. Sandford (its
unwarranted substantive due process and its being overly positivist and
originalist); Plessy v. Ferguson (its allowance of racial categorizations and
its being “overly formalistic about race, missing the social meaning of Jim
Crow”);99 and Lochner v. New York100 (its reliance on a substantive due
process doctrine that prefers liberty of contract and laissez-faire
capitalism).101 Each indulged in an ill-advised judgment about the best
interests of the Court. As with Korematsu, the court of history has pinned
them each on a wall of shame. Subsequent scholarship consistently cites
them as partially responsible for the disastrous consequences that followed
these decisions.102 Institutionalism, examined in this way, loses its allure
when these infamous cases are included as a part of a discussion on the
merits. But, highlighting missteps is critical because of what they reveal about
the risks and rewards of institutionalism. Judges who step outside the
boundaries of law to insert extralegal considerations are capable of protecting
the natural rights and fundamental dignity of litigants. When viewed as a
holistic body of decisions, positive outcomes have outweighed negative
consequences such that the judiciary still holds institutional legitimacy in
American democracy that is sufficient to check the political branches.
II. BOUND TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOALS
Part I conceptualizes the landscape of the institutionalist approach. It
outlines how judges choose à la carte from extralegal considerations, making
the approach more of a constitutional ethos than a theory of interpretation.
Specifically, this Note has examined how a judge can decide on a
case-by-case basis when to deploy extralegal considerations in order to reach
results that insulate the Court from public criticism, to give partisan camps
a comparable number of court victories, or to stand for precedents that are
morally conscionable. Altogether, this shows the faith and trust that our
system places in the judiciary to make prudent use of that power for the goal
of stabilizing, rather than degrading, democracy. But, given the potential
fallibility of these judgments—especially the bad judgments considered in
Part I.C.—it seems crucial for the institutionalist approach to yield to
some actual constitutional authority. In other words, we need to articulate
98

Id. at 425.
Id. at 460.
100
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
101
Greene, supra note 79, at 460.
102
Id. at 462.
99
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what tethers institutionalists to binding rule of law. Perhaps even more
importantly, we need to identify what authority constrains rogue judges who
operate under the guise of institutionalism in the event that the degradation
of democracy comes from inside the courtroom. To do that, first, this Part
discusses theories that ground institutionalism in the Constitution. Next, it
advances popular alternative theories to formalism in the hopes that they can
help support a constitutional foundation for extralegal considerations.
Finally, this Part explains why the special role of the judiciary, as suggested
by its Hamiltonian moniker of “the least dangerous” branch,103 makes it the
best branch to wield the double-edged sword on quests that protect
institutional legitimacy. The goal is to revamp institutionalist theory, so that
it appears more like traditional, or formalist, modes of constitutional
interpretation. This aims to bolster the integrity of institutionalist opinions,
so, hopefully, a Justice would not feel compelled to “hide [his] head in a
bag” out of shame if he signed onto one.104
A. Applying for a Constitutional License
As this Note provided in Part I.A., theories of interpretation exist to
determine the basic truth of an answer to a constitutional question. Building
a foundation for constitutional truth establishes the source of the authority
for the decision. For example, originalism is an appealing method of
constitutional interpretation for some scholars because it “accords binding
authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its adopters.”105
While generations of scholars and judges have developed competing ideas
about how to determine what exactly the framers meant when they drafted
the Constitution, the communicative content of the Constitution is
“fixed.”106 Regardless of one’s approach, originalists judges are, in theory,
103

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 6 (explaining a popular, yet debated, view that the
American judiciary poses a comparatively minor threat to the constitutional rights of citizens because it
retains little actual power and depends on the political branches to uphold its judgments).
104
Institutionalism, specifically its appeal to extralegal considerations discussed in this Note, has
been subject to contempt and ire, especially from formalist originalists. For example, in Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), Justice Scalia added a footnote to his scathing dissent for the express
purpose of mocking Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion’s perhaps metaphysical opening line: “The
Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that
allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.” Id. at 719 n.22 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (referencing id. at 651-52 (majority opinion)). Justice Scalia sneers that if, for whatever
reason, he somehow felt obliged to sign onto an opinion that began with such a line, then “I would hide
my head in a bag. The Supreme Court of the United States has descended from the disciplined legal
reasoning of John Marshall and Joseph Story to the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie.” Id. at 719
n.22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This acerbic rebuke exemplifies the importance of developing a working
theory of constitutional authority for institutionalism.
105
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204,
204 (1980).
106
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 21, 27 (2015) (explaining one theory of originalist analysis purporting that
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constrained by the original public meaning of the Constitution.107
Institutionalists, though, may seek flexibility to move away from the fixed,
original communicative content of the framers or to formulate implied
rights. They may even seek to oscillate between multiple theories of
interpretation—thus diminishing the predictability of adjudication.108 To
determine the correctness of an answer that is animated by an institutionalist
approach, this subpart searches the limits of constitutional authority for
grounds on which to stake institutionalism.
First, with respect to constitutional authority, generally, the logical place
to start an investigation is the text of the Constitution. Where the text itself
is ambiguous, judges and constitutional scholars have debated the respective
merits of two competing visions of statutory interpretation: purposivism
(that is, understanding and enforcing the intent of Congress as accurately as
possible) versus textualism (that is, applying the plain meaning of the
language in the text as it would be understood by the average person
today).109 Both purposivists and textualists claim to respect authority,
whether it is the expressed or implied intentions of the body that
promulgated a law or the plain meaning of the language that appears in the
promulgated law.110 But, it should be clear why institutionalist prerogatives
do not fit neatly within the boundaries of either of these theories. If anything,
the institutionalist judge selects from both purposivism and textualism à la
carte, depending on whether text or intent brings him to his preferred

the communicative content of a text is “fixed at the time of framing and ratification, but the facts to which
the text can be applied change over time,” and explaining how we can discern meaning by embracing the
“original public meaning” of statutory language at the time of ratification) (emphasis omitted).
107
Id. at 7.
108
See generally Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 335, 336 (2005) (explaining the legality doctrine and how it relates to the idea of rule of
law by providing both “fair notice” and “fair adjudication”).
109
See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 76
(2006) (“Textualists give precedence to semantic context—evidence that goes to the way a reasonable person
would use language under the circumstances. Purposivists give priority to policy context—evidence that
suggests the way a reasonable person would address the mischief being remedied.”).
110
See, e.g., id. at 73–74 (explaining the basis for such a view); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85–88 (2005) (explaining why a purposive approach to
constitutional interpretation is more consistent with the theory of democracy in the Constitution and
advocating for a “reasonable member of Congress” standard in discerning intent); HUGO LAFAYETTE
BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 45 (1968) (arguing that he takes an absolutist approach to laws
restricting speech—“without deviation, without exception, without any ifs, buts, or whereases”—because of
the “clear wording of the First Amendment . . . . ‘Congress shall make no law’ means Congress shall make
no law”) (emphasis added); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 15–16 (2012) (explaining that a textualist approach to statutory interpretation is ideal
because, “in its purest form, [it] begins and ends with what the text says and fairly implies”); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990) (“The new textualism posits that once
the Court has ascertained a statute’s plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant.
Legislative history should not even be consulted to confirm the apparent meaning of a statutory text.”).
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conclusion most efficiently.
This paradigm matters because crossing the lines delineated by this debate
can cause judges to occupy an ignominious space: the land of hopelessly
biased rogue judges decried by critics as judicial activists. The judicial activist
serves as a foot soldier in ordinary partisan warfare and wields the law as a
blunt object to further one side of a political skirmish.112 Labelling a judge as
a “judicial activist” is to condemn him for overstepping his constitutional
duties and for engaging in “results-oriented judging” that fits his preferred
ideology, furthers a political party’s policy goals, or fulfills some other
self-serving extralegal purpose.113 Some scholars have defended “activist”
judges and challenged the presumption that judicial activism is inherently
wrong.114 But, the point of this subpart is not to acquit institutionalists, who
look to extralegal considerations in furtherance of perceived threats to
democracy, of the possible crime of judicial activism. Rather, the point is to
suggest theories of legal restraints for institutionalist judges whose
consequentialism motivates their analyses. Thus, institutionalists operate not
as rogue judges, but rather as disciples of an ordered constitutional code of
conduct when they interpret constitutional ambiguities.
1. The Representation-Reinforcement Theory
The first theory of constitutional authority for institutionalism stems
from John Hart Ely’s renowned conception of judicial review, which
outlines the role of the courts in achieving the Constitution’s clear goal of
representative democracy. 115 Ely’s theory addresses the tension that exists
between the core American governmental principle of majority rule from the
111

Compare supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (explaining how Chief Justice Roberts
evaded the intent of the legislature that wrote the individual mandate into the ACA by interrogating the
plain meaning of the language used in the provision, which, he decided, meant that the individual mandate
had the legal effect of a tax), with supra note 82 and accompanying text (describing the Brown Court as
institutionalist and explaining how the unanimous majority found that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited segregated schools, even if it was not the specific intent of the framers of the amendment).
112
See Frank B. Cross & Stefanie A. Lindquist, The Scientific Study of Judicial Activism, 91 MINN.
L. REV. 1752, 1752–53 (2007) (describing the “negative connotation” associated with judicial activism
and discussing how both conservatives and liberals use the term to attack judges who make decisions
with which they disagree).
113
Id. at 1766.
114
See id. at 1753 (referencing scholarly contentions that judicial activism enables courts “to live
up to [their] obligation to serve as citadel[s] of the public justice”).
115
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
77–78 (1980) (establishing that the American system purports to create a “representative government,”
which protects minorities from the tyranny of the majority and forms the basis of his thesis); Greene,
supra note 69, at 37–38 (explaining the representation reinforcement theory “as Professor John Hart Ely
famously envisioned it” in the context of a political process that cannot be trusted with protecting the
rights of minorities); Adam Liptak, John Hart Ely, a Constitutional Scholar, Is Dead at 64, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 27, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/27/us/john-hart-ely-a-constitutional-scholar-isdead-at-64.html (describing Ely as one of the most cited legal scholars of all-time).
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consent of the governed and the problem that “a majority with untrammeled
power to set governmental policy is in a position to deal itself benefits at the
expense of the remaining minority.”116 Because of this tension, Ely reasons
that the Constitution must ipso facto include methods for protecting the
rights of political minorities that are “not a flagrant contradiction of the
principle of majority rule.”117 According to Ely, the solution lies within the
Constitution’s consistent guarantees of “procedural fairness” and “broad
participation in the processes . . . of government.”118 Applying those
principles to judicial review, the Constitution prescribes that judges take:
[A] representation-reinforcing approach . . . [which] is not
inconsistent with, but on the contrary (and quite by design)
entirely supportive of, the underlying premises of the American
system of representative democracy. [And] such an approach
. . . involves tasks that courts, as experts on process and (more
important) as political outsiders, can sensibly claim to be better
qualified and situated to perform than political officials.119
Critically for institutionalist purposes, Ely avers that the Constitution also
supplies a limiting principle to the Court’s ability to interpret ambiguous
provisions in contravention of majority rule. A representation-reinforcing
approach to the judiciary restricts courts from recognizing or creating
fundamental rights that do not involve issues of representation.120 Harnessing
Justice Harlan Stone’s thematic summation of judicial review in his renowned
footnote to United States v. Carolene Products Co.,121 Ely explains that it is
enabling universal participation in the political process—not making value
judgments about whether substantive rights are “fundamental”—that licenses
judicial authority.122 Thus, the representation-reinforcement theory constrains
judges by requiring them to exercise judicial review when laws implicate the
116

ELY, supra note 115, at 7.
Id. at 8.
118
Id. at 87.
119
Id. at 88.
120
Id.
121
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
122
ELY, supra note 115, at 77; see Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4 (suggesting that
the ordinary presumption of a law’s constitutionality may not apply if a law (1) appears to violate a
specific provision of the Constitution; (2) “restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation”; or (3) involves “prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities . . . which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities”). Contra Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
131, 140, 142 (1981) (“[The] representation-reinforcing enterprise is shot full of value choices, starting with
the decision of just how representative our various systems of government ought to be and who ought to be
included in the political community, and ending with (covert) choices about who is justifiably the object of
prejudice and whether legislative goals are sufficiently important to warrant the burdens they impose on
some members of society. . . . For in his heroic attempt to establish a value-free mode of constitutional
adjudication, John Hart Ely has come as close as anyone could to proving that it can’t be done.”).
117
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rights of minorities vis-á-vis the political process. Simultaneously, it prevents
them from making personal value judgments about the existence of other
fundamental rights.
Representation-reinforcement instructs judges to resolve the tension
between majority rule and minority rights. The theory affirms the
artfulness inherent to interpreting a Constitution that alternates between
speaking in “majestic generalities” and “elegant specificity.”123 Yet
representation-reinforcement is not a general license for judges to embark
on a journey of unfettered consequentialism while using judicial review as a
bulldozer to arrive at their policy preferences. Rather, it gives institutionalist
judges a license with substantial restrictions. The Constitution directs the
judiciary to interpret ambiguities in favor of increasing participation in the
political process and to create rights protecting minorities from the
majority.124 Because the Court is encumbered with this responsibility, rather
than the political branches, it links the institutional health of the Court with
the political health of discrete and insular minorities. Viewed this way, the
Court is a guardrail against the tyranny of the majority. Therefore, the
Constitution empowers judges to craft opinions with the express purpose of
avoiding bad outcomes, such as a decision that upholds the constitutionality
of segregated schools, which a more formalist methodology might allow.
But, given Ely’s restriction on the ability of judges to create new
fundamental rights, representation-reinforcement theory still does not quite
answer how institutionalist judges have the authority to update rights that
are not clearly related to the goals of representative government. As Paul
Brest retorted to Ely, a representative theory of judicial review still must
involve some value judgments about political participation.125 The problem
with constitutionally licensing institutionalist judging, then, rests with this
hopeless lack of neutrality. Value judgments can be arbitrary, and skeptics
insist that such arbitrariness cancels out any purported limiting principle.126
Put succinctly, the response to Brest’s critique is that the judiciary can (and
should) be entrusted with good-faith adherence to constitutional constraints
on its role as a democratic institution that protects minority rights—an idea
that will be developed in depth later in this Part.127 For now, though, a working
123
See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 846 (2015)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943))
(acknowledging that ambiguities limit the helpfulness of the text in interpreting certain provisions of the
Constitution, such as the First and Fourth Amendment).
124
See ELY, supra note 115, at 102 (explaining why the need for perspective means “a
representation-reinforcing approach assigns judges a role they are conspicuously well situated to fill”).
125
Brest, supra note 122, at 140, 142.
126
Donald W. Fisher, The Problem of the Value-Judgment, 12 PHIL. REV. 623, 623–24 (1913).
127
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 25–26 (2d. ed. 1986) (“[C]ourts have certain capacities for dealing with matters of
principle that legislatures and executives do not possess. Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the
training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government.”).
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theory of institutionalism demands another foothold in constitutional
authority. It must explain why American democracy allows courts to take
liberties with the inherent flexibility of a representation-reinforcement
approach to political rights.
2. The Rules of Stare Decisis
The second theory of authority for institutionalism is embedded in the
process by which judges interpret, frame, and develop the law in accordance
with their constitutional duties. Under that view, legal scholars comprehend
American constitutional law as a “mixed system,” comprising both text and
precedent, much like common law.128 Connecting constitutional law to
common law principles illuminates the work that judges do when they
interpret ambiguous constitutional text, and, given the evolutionary process
of common law adjudication, it positions the institutionalist judge as a major
component in that system.129 Elaborating on this point, Professor David
Strauss contends that judges interpret provisions of the Constitution in a
manner that is similar to how precedents in a common law system are
“expanded, limited, qualified, reconceived, relegated to the background, or
all-but ignored.”130 Essentially, there is a judgment about the most favorable,
workable version of constitutional text as applied at law, based on the facts
of particular cases, and then subsequent judges confront the precedent
resulting from those particular cases—as opposed to engaging with the
actual text of the Constitution or the discerned intent of the framers.131 Of
course, judges may not contravene the explicit rules set forth in the
Constitution, but, as Strauss argues, the task of constitutional interpretation
is an “evolutionary process[].”132 Considering the Constitution as a text
whose meaning evolves over time presupposes a foundation for freeing
judges from the specific restraints created by the purposivist/textualist
128
David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1,
13 (2015). See generally K. N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–3
(1934) (developing this theory of a common law approach to constitutional law upon which Strauss and
other subsequent scholars have expanded).
129
Strauss, supra note 128, at 28 (citing examples of precedents that judges use to interpret
ambiguous constitutional provisions and describing the mixed system as one that takes text and “common
law-like evolutionary processes and combin[es] them in a way that lacks clear priority rules”). See, e.g.,
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970) (“It has always been the duty of the
common-law court to perceive the impact of major legislative innovations and to interweave the new
legislative policies with the inherited body of common-law principles . . . .”).
130
Strauss, supra note 128, at 4–5.
131
Id. Strauss further elaborates on the common law aspect of constitutional precedent that, “[o]nce
a large body of precedent-based law has developed, the text will recede from view.” Id. at 5. As an
example, he points out that a landmark precedent like Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803),
may be invoked by judges for “rhetorical effect” to embody principles of judicial review, but “the
reasoning and precise holding of Marbury do not determine the scope of judicial review today.” Strauss,
supra note 128, at 5. The text of the Constitution operates on a similar level. Id.
132
Strauss, supra note 128, at 28.
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debate. If authority is not limited to rote application of the text or the intent
of the legislating body, then the institutional constraints that bind judges to
that prior precedent—stare decisis—emerges instead.
Stare decisis, and the deference given to it by common-law judges,
bestows a limiting principle onto the power of individual judges. Principles
of stare decisis require judges to remain in their constitutional lanes by
seeking their respect for past precedent. Justice Elena Kagan defended her
loyal respect for past precedent in her dissenting opinion in Knick v.
Township of Scott,133 which overturned precedent on the issue of eminent
domain in the context of state law:
“[I]t promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity
of the judicial process.” Stare decisis, of course, is “not an
inexorable command.” But it is not enough that five Justices
believe a precedent wrong. Reversing course demands a
“special justification—over and above the belief that the
precedent was wrongly decided.”134
Judges routinely disagree about what kind of a “special justification”
actually licenses a court to scrap an existing precedent.135 But, stare decisis
remains a foundational truth of the American judiciary. By examining stare
decisis, we see the numerous ways in which the Constitution entrusts limited
power to the judiciary.
The special authority that the American “mixed” system imparts on
judges to develop, modify, and change legal precedents has its ultimate
origins in the separation of powers that divides judicial and political
authority.136 Professor Kiel Brennan-Marquez explains that stare decisis
represents the principle that “distinguishes the form of power wielded by
judges from that wielded by other officials.”137 Unlike a lawmaker, who has
133

139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
Id. at 2189 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
135
See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Aggregate Stare Decisis, 97 IND. L.J. 571, 572-78 (2022)
(comparing two theories about what justifies overruling past precedent). The first theory, articulated by
Justice Kagan, is that a “special justification” is required. Id. at 573, 573 n.5 (quoting Knick, 139 S. Ct.
at 2189 (Kagan, J., dissenting)). The second theory, espoused by Justice Kavanaugh, is that only
“grievously or egregiously wrong” precedent—not a “garden-variety error or disagreement”—can be
overturned. Id. at 575, 575 n.9 (quoting Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414 (2020)).
136
Id. at 582-83; see also id. at 578-79 nn.25–26 (summarizing scholars and judges who have
theorized that stare decisis flows from Article III’s “cases and controversies” requirement and from the
features that distinguish courts from legislatures or enforcement institutions).
137
Id. at 581-82 (discussing stare decisis as a unique feature of courts that is “imaginable . . . across
time, working alongside the political process—but also distinct from it—to reflect and produce our selfconception as a polity.”). Brennan-Marquez notes that “judges must take precedent seriously—not
because it will necessarily lead to favorable results, but because precedent reflects the reasoned judgment
of predecessors and, on that basis alone, warrants solicitude.” Id. at 583.
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absolutely no duty to abide by past decisions of the legislative body—as the
lawmaker is a part of the political process that is geared toward change—a
judge stands as one mere mortal in a line of jurists “who grappled with the
same questions and left their mark on the law.”138 That canonization of the
decisions of fellow judges constructs the boundaries on judicial power.139
The result is that stare decisis checks the institutional benefits of the
judiciary, such as life tenure for judges and lack of political accountability
for decisions.140 Thus, the judiciary is both defined and organized according
to its function in the American political system as an institutional body. It is
this institutional body that we inherently trust to use its judgment to
formulate the law based on precedent and some other special reasons, even
the extralegal considerations outlined earlier in this Note. Using the same
rationale that is behind the principles of stare decisis, we can apprehend the
constitutional license that institutionalist judges use to base decisions on
extralegal considerations. Because these extralegal considerations guard the
integrity of the institutional body, institutionalism conforms to the specific
authority granted by their constitutional roles.
However, a question remains that challenges this analysis: what exactly
constrains judges who, even under this framework, retain substantial
discretion to make and break precedents on which future judges will rely?141
Consider a retort from a formalist like Justice Scalia: that proponents of a
living, common-law constitution want to strip “the people” of the power to
decide political issues and delegate it to judges.142 Under that view,
institutionalists are “not looking for legal flexibility[;] they are looking for
rigidity” for these extralegal considerations, and stare decisis may not be
sufficient to stop them.143 Indeed, as scholars have noted, addressing that
138

Id. at 581-82.
Id. at 581.
140
Id.
141
See id. (challenging the presumption that respect for precedent represents a limitation on judicial
power, not “a mechanism for entrenchment” for judges who actually create precedent).
142
Jonathan Ewing, Scalia Has Harsh Words for Those Who Believe in ‘Living Constitution’,
LAW.COM (Feb. 15, 2006), https://www.law.com/almID/900005547733/ (quoting Justice Scalia’s
declaration that “you would have to be an idiot” to believe that the Constitution “has to change with
society, like a living organism, or it will become brittle and break” because “[t]he Constitution is not a
living organism, it is a legal document”).
143
Id. Justice Scalia lists “the right to abortion” and “the right to homosexual activity” as examples
of the kind of rigidity that living constitutionalists wish to impose on the American people. Id. Without
engaging Justice Scalia on the merits of why these rights are fundamental, it suffices to point out that
self-proclaimed originalists tend to abandon their formalism when rights that the Republican Party like
are at stake. See generally Enrique Schaerer, What the Heller?: An Originalist Critique of Justice Scalia’s
Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 795, 799–801 (2014) (exploring the flaws in
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion for District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), which argues
that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to possess any weapon in “common use at some
ever-changing ‘present’ time”). In general, when it comes to the Second Amendment, originalists tend
to happen upon new elasticity in the text that allows them to expand gun ownership rights.
139
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loophole may require more significant structural reforms to better check the
judicial branch.144 Setting aside Justice Scalia’s dubious conviction that only
originalists do not resolve cases in favor of a preferred political agenda, it
does appear important to manage the discretion conferred upon courts.
Regarding stare decisis, Brennan-Marquez proposes an “aggregate voting
rule” which quantifies a precedent based on how many judges comprised the
majority that instituted the rule in the first place, then qualifies its
continuation on the number of judges in favor of overturning the rule.145 This
proposal aims to solve the problem of vesting judges with the discretion to
willfully make and break precedent as they see fit. For now—that is, until
the judiciary seriously considers or adopts a less theoretical approach—the
real authoritative constraint on institutionalist judges may have to come from
their function as one of three coequal branches in the American
constitutional government.
B. Why Not the Judiciary?
Part III concludes by advancing a final argument about why the
Constitution authorizes institutionalist judges to deploy extralegal
considerations in furtherance of institutional goals. This theory draws from
both representation-reinforcement and principles of stare decisis, which lead
to the question: why shouldn’t judges have institutional power? In fact, the
Constitution and the principles of liberty contemplated by the framers when
they created the judiciary provide satisfying insights.
The first explanation for trusting judges with this institutional power is
found in the proposition that, while judges represent a counter-majoritarian
element of American democracy, their constitutional authority derives from
the people just as much as the other branches of government.146 As Justice
Breyer explained, “though the power is dispersed, the people themselves
continue to control the policy-making activities of these different branches
of government.”147 From this idea, the Constitution is driven by the quest to
produce a government that is not only democratic or protective of
individual liberty, but “practically workable” and functionally able to protect

144

See generally Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE
L.J. 148, 152 (2019) (explaining the need for Supreme Court reform and outlining theories that could
achieve such reform).
145
See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 135, at 576 (outlining a “non-merits” approach to modifying
precedents). The aggregate voting rule allows precedent to be modified “only if the tally of votes across
both courts—the court that fashioned the precedent at t1 and the one scrutinizing it at t2—totals a
majority.” Id.
146
See BREYER, supra note 110, at 26–27 (explaining that the Framers of the Constitution conceived
of the nonlegislative branches as recipients of power that the people submit in “allotment[s]” to a
representative government).
147
Id. at 27.
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individuals from oppression by the ruling political faction of the majority.148
To that end, James Madison explained that the framers created a government
that “secure[s] the public good and private rights against the danger of
[factionalism], and at the same time . . . preserve[s] the spirit and form of
popular government.”149 The role of the Court, then, is to interpret the
Constitution in the spirit of that framework and to ensure that the people can
actively participate in their government.150 Thus, it follows that the framers
envisioned an ethos for judges that gears courts towards identifying the
contours of the rights held by non-majorities.
At this point, we still find ourselves trapped in a theoretical sketch of
how courts define rights. Here, the legal boundaries of institutionalism may
rest on the framers’ desire for an independent judiciary and the function of
the judiciary in American constitutional law. The argument certainly
involves constraining judges with structural safeguards, which define a
system of checks and balances among federal branches that prevents
tyrannical actions of any one branch.151 But, it may be important to concede
that additional structural reforms are necessary to most effectively prevent a
free-wheeling institutionalist judge from making bad judgments. What
remains is an admittedly fragile system that empowers judges to interpret
the Constitution with an eye towards the conclusions that fulfill the
judiciary’s responsibility to preserve a democratic tradition. Legal customs,
judicial precedent, and democratic norms make up the bulwark of
constitutional authority for institutionalist judging. Still, the institutionalist
ethos remains broad.
The position staked regarding the constitutionality of an institutionalist
approach to judging remains murky and possibly in need of structural reform.
Yet, the position offers a strong foundation for understanding why the
framers—and generations since—have trusted judges to make responsible,
temperate choices about using extralegal considerations to solve cases.
Occasional bad outcomes are tolerable in light of the larger purpose that the
judiciary fills in a functional democracy. Whether judges can and should be
trusted, and how much we can afford to tolerate bad judgments, implicates the
legitimacy of courts as an institution, as Part III explores.
III. INSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN: HOW ILLEGITIMATE
COURTS WRECK DEMOCRACIES
The constitutional authority that grants judges a license to issue
institutionalist opinions is reasonable in light of the role of the judiciary,
although it remains speculative. But, as Part III argues, the effect that
148

Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 28–29 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)).
150
Id. at 33.
151
Id. at 31.
149
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institutionalism has on the preservation of judicial legitimacy may be its
most important function in a fragile democracy. Because courts function as
critical safeguards against the rise of autocracy in a fragile democracy,
legitimacy serves as a compelling reason for the Constitution to permit these
kinds of judges. This Part shows that good faith attempts by judges to avoid
outcomes that would further erode the legitimacy of courts could help stave
off total breakdown of democratic institutions in the United States and across
the globe in an age of institutional crisis. It advances reasons why the
benefits of allowing institutionalist judges outweigh the risks.
A. Democratic Institutions Face a Legitimacy Crisis
1. The Authoritarian Rule of Law
Today, written constitutions alone may fail to save democracy. The
urgent context for the conversation on judicial authority involves the
persistent worldwide degradation of democracies, which coincides with the
gradual rise of authoritarianism.152 According to Freedom House, the
catastrophic COVID-19 pandemic, prolonged economic crises, political
crises, and violent conflicts pointed to the deepening of a “long democratic
recession” in 2021.153 Freedom House found that governments faced few
consequences for repressive measures, leaving women and racial, ethnic,
and religious minorities particularly vulnerable to human rights abuses.154
Further, Freedom House cited “[t]he eclipse of US leadership” and “[t]he
exposure of US democracy’s vulnerabilities” as major factors in the rise of
anti-democratic regimes.155 Highlighting President Trump’s refusal to admit
defeat in the 2020 election based on false allegations of voter fraud, as well
as President Trump’s calls for disproportionate violence by police in
response to racial justice protests throughout 2020, Freedom House
concluded that, in order to prevent further democratic backsliding, the
United States must “strengthen its institutional safeguards, restore its civic
norms, and uphold the promise of its core principles for all segments of
society.”156 Despite this backsliding, Freedom House cited the resolve of

152
See SARAH REPUCCI & AMY SLIPOWITZ, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2021:
DEMOCRACY UNDER SIEGE 1 (2021), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/FIW2021_
World_02252021_FINAL-web-upload.pdf (writing that “democracy’s defenders sustained heavy new
losses in their struggle against authoritarian foes, shifting the international balance in favor of tyranny”
to preface a finding that global freedom declined for the fifteenth consecutive year and that more
countries experienced deteriorations than experienced improvements).
153
Id. Freedom House is a non-governmental organization that “produces research and reports on
a number of core thematic issues related to democracy, political rights and civil liberties.” About Us,
FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/about-us (last visited Apr. 8, 2021).
154
REPUCCI & SLIPOWITZ, supra note 152, at 1–2.
155
Id. at 8–10.
156
Id. at 2–3.
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U.S. courts in holding strong during the election process. These findings
help articulate how courts uphold the rule of law and neutralize authoritarian
threats to democracy.
First, it is necessary to establish whether courts can successfully stave
off democratic decline and check authoritarianism when deploying
constitutional law. To begin, we must query what really allows American
democracy to function. It is not the Constitution—neither its text nor the
intent of its framers.158 Instead, it is the trust that Americans place in the
legitimacy of political institutions to stand up against unconstitutional forces
and, in each branch of government, to make good-faith efforts to “check”
the other branches.159 For the Supreme Court, legitimacy means that the
Court must maintain the American people’s “faith in the Supreme Court’s
ability to render impartial justice” and “[to] resolve important questions in
ways that all Americans can live with.”160 Over the years, the Court has
mostly succeeded in maintaining this public confidence.161 By serving as an
effective check on the political branches of government, the Court’s
legitimacy has survived and has instilled public confidence in the rule of
law.162 Because of their function in establishing the rule of law, courts can
serve as the final bulwark against authoritarians who aim to degrade a
democracy. Yet, that hinges on their ability to check the political branches
157
Id. at 9. Freedom House also took note of the constitutional court of Malawi, which resisted
bribery attempts from the party in power and called for a new election after evidence emerged that the
incumbent president had won because of election fraud. Id. at 14–15. The opposition candidate ended up
winning the new election and taking power. Id. Malawi demonstrates an example of legitimate courts
checking authoritarianism and propping up democracy—an idea that animates much of this Part.
158
See Marek D. Steedman, Taming Leviathan, 52 TULSA L. REV. 621, 622, 632 (2017) (reviewing
ROBERT MICKEY, PATHS OUT OF DIXIE: THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AUTHORITARIAN ENCLAVES IN
AMERICA’S DEEP SOUTH, 1944-1972 (2015)) (reviewing Mickey’s claim that the Jim Crow Southern
states operated as “a set of authoritarian enclaves nestled with a larger federal democracy” and explaining
his conclusion that “democratic façades are easier to construct and maintain than the institutions and
norms that make for democratic realities”).
159
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“[U]surpations are guarded against by a division
of the government into distinct and separate departments. . . . Hence a double security arises to the rights
of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be
controlled by itself.”).
160
Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 144, at 151.
161
See, e.g., id.; Ilya Somin, Is the Supreme Court Going to Suffer a Crisis of Legitimacy?, REASON:
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 9, 2018, 3:02 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/10/09/is-the-supremecourt-going-to-suffer-a-c/ (explaining evidence that the predictions of danger to the institution “may well
be overblown, as they often have been in the past”); Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux & Oliver Roeder, Is the
Supreme Court Facing a Legitimacy Crisis?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 1, 2018, 6:00
AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/is-the-supreme-court-facing-a-legitimacy-crisis/ (analyzing
historical data that shows that Americans “have more trust in the Supreme Court than in other political
institutions” and that the Court “has recovered from moments of potential partisan taint before”). The
Supreme Court regularly scores higher public approval ratings than the President or Congress. Jeffrey
M. Jones, Trust in Judicial Branch Up, Executive Branch Down, GALLUP (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/219674/trust-judicial-branch-executive-branch-down.aspx.
162
Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 144, at 151.
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in a manner that is reliable and in good faith.
2.

Judicial Tampering and Other American Vulnerabilities

The present intensification of political division along party lines spreads
to the Supreme Court. That development jeopardizes public confidence in
democracy in novel, volatile ways. Of course, throughout the history of the
Supreme Court, bouts of political conflict, economic crises, national security
threats, and social change have tested the durability of America’s
constitutional system. But, scholars caution that there is scant historical
precedent for a Supreme Court that is viewed by a majority of the public as
a “party-dominated institution.”163 Professors Daniel Epps and Ganesh
Sitaraman clarify that the present moment is without comparison because,
first, earlier American political tribalism has been aligned more on regional
or geographical, as opposed to partisan, grounds, and, second, current
Supreme Court Justices are less likely than ever to vote against the party of
the president who appointed them.164 This rise of a partisan Court has
transformed the judiciary into a weapon of mass destruction in a
constitutional arms race centered on a partisan battle for federal judicial
appointments.165 Throughout the past several years, we have seen what these
challenges for the Court look like when party affiliation matters more than
anything in the lengths that partisan actors go to control the courts.
Clearly, judicial legitimacy suffers because of partisan cage fights over
courts.166 Since 2016, political parties have increasingly exploited
constitutional quirks in the process of judicial appointments to control
courts. Republicans would argue that the “original sin” instigating unfair
partisanship in judicial appointments occurred decades earlier, in 1987,
when Senate Democrats rejected President Ronald Reagan’s nomination of
Judge Robert Bork, although the Merrick Garland incident represented an
even more egregious attempt to strip away the appointment power of a
sitting president.167 In a major violation of norms, Senate Majority Leader
163

Lee Epstein & Eric Posner, Opinion, If the Supreme Court Is Nakedly Political, Can It Be Just?,
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/opinion/supreme-court-nomineetrump.html; see also LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 8–9 (emphasizing that “[o]ur Madisonian
system of checks and balances has endured for more than two centuries,” surviving “the Civil War, the
Great Depression, the Cold War, and Watergate,” but cautioning that history shows how “extreme
partisan polarization” involving “existential conflict over race and culture” can “kill democracies”).
164
Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 144, at 155–56.
165
Id. at 155.
166
Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240, 2242
(2019) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT (2018)).
167
Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 144, at 156–57; Grove, supra note 166, at 2274 nn.156–57 (citing
sources on competing sides of the debate considering which party began the trend of politicizing the
Supreme Court and has engaged in “hardball” to a greater degree). Taking this power to its logical
conclusion in the run-up to the 2016 election, some Republican senators even vowed to oppose any
Supreme Court nominee of Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton if she won the election. Sabrina
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Mitch McConnell refused to hold confirmation hearings for President
Obama’s Supreme Court nominee for the vacancy left by Justice Scalia’s
2016 death.168 After President Trump’s unexpected election victory in the
2016 election, Senate Republicans unabashedly employed the “nuclear
option” to defy fierce Democratic opposition and to confirm Trump’s
replacement nominee, Justice Gorsuch, by a historically slim margin.169 Less
than two years later, President Trump’s second nominee, Justice Kavanaugh,
was confirmed, also by a slim margin. Republicans defended Justice
Kavanaugh in spite of an outrageous confirmation process that involved
sexual assault allegations and his shocking Senate testimony that overtly
accused Democrats of leading a smear campaign against his nomination.170
Justice Kavanaugh’s confirmation marked a new level of partisan hostility
and looming danger to the Court’s legitimacy.171
Extraordinary events towards the end of President Trump’s term added
fuel to the political fire, particularly the Senate’s acquittal of two
independent impeachment charges against the President, the COVID-19
pandemic, strict lockdowns, and a summer of widespread racial justice
protests. In September, the Supreme Court faced another contentious
confirmation process. Hours after Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg died of
complications from metastatic pancreatic cancer, the Republican Senate
majority, in a shameless reversal of position from 2016, began a rush to
confirm President Trump’s third Supreme Court nominee, Justice Amy
Coney Barrett, mere weeks before the 2020 election.172 Finally, courts
became embroiled in President Trump’s quixotic post-election lawsuits to
challenge his loss. Almost instantly after networks projected that Biden had
been elected President, winning with an Electoral College margin of
306-232, President Trump commenced a series of lawsuits to overturn the
election results in key swing states, making repeated, baseless claims of

Siddiqui, Republican Senators Vow to Block Any Clinton Supreme Court Nominee Forever, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 2, 2016, 9:02 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/nov/01/republican-senators-opposeclinton-supreme-court-nominee.
168
Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 144, at 156–57.
169
Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 144, at 157.
170
Id. at 158–59.
171
Thomson-DeVeaux & Roeder, supra note 161.
172
The Republican Senate confirmed Justice Barrett—an avowed conservative—on a strict 52-48
party-line vote just over one week before the November 3, 2020 election in the midst of the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic. Nicholas Fandos, The Senate Confirms Barrett on a Nearly Party-Line Vote,
Delivering a Win to Trump that Tips the Supreme Court to the Right., N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/10/26/us/trump-biden-election/the-senate-confirms-barrett-on-a-ne
arly-party-line-vote-delivering-a-win-to-trump-that-tips-the-supreme-court-to-the-right (Nov. 8, 2020).
One Republican, Senator Susan Collins of Maine, voted in opposition to the confirmation of Justice
Barrett. Id. This rapid confirmation created a scenario in which Justice Barrett could have presided over
a potential election challenge at the Supreme Court.
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173

voter fraud. In spite of the rise of the partisan court, federal judges—even
ones appointed by President Trump—quickly dismissed sixty-one of the
sixty-three lawsuits filed in states that President Trump lost as without
merit.174 Thus, courts protected American democracy from a grave threat in
2021. But their quick dismissals of post-election lawsuits also failed to
dissuade the sitting President from propagating a dangerous, false narrative
of a stolen election.
Obvious losses in federal courts did not deter President Trump and many
congressional Republicans who continued to cast doubt on the legitimacy of
President Biden’s win. President Trump’s “stolen victory” narrative
climaxed when his supporters, at his unsubtle urging, violently stormed and
overran law enforcement at the United States Capitol as Congress counted
the electoral votes, in a desperate attempt to overturn President Biden’s
election victory, resulting in six deaths.175 Here, too, the Supreme Court was
involved: first, when President Trump initiated a long-shot lawsuit brought
by the state of Texas to throw out Pennsylvania’s electoral votes—which the
Supreme Court rejected for lack of standing;176 and second, when revelations
surfaced that Virginia Thomas, the wife of Justice Clarence Thomas and
“vocal right-wing activist,” actively participated in the promotion of the
insurrection and efforts to overturn the election.177 As of the date of this
writing, new information comes to light on a regular basis regarding the
insurrection, attempted coup, and the complicity of major government
figures. The diligent investigation of the House Select Committee has
uncovered extraordinary evidence that exceeds anything that was
173
William Cummings, Joey Garrison & Jim Sergent, By the Numbers: President Donald Trump’s
Failed Efforts to Overturn the Election, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/politic
s/elections/2021/01/06/trumps-failed-efforts-overturn-election-numbers/4130307001/ (Jan. 6, 2021,
10:50 AM) (explaining the scope of the Trump campaign’s lawsuits in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Arizona,
and Georgia).
174
Id.
175
See Dylan Stableford, New Video Shows Trump Rally Crowd Cheering Call to ‘Storm the
Capitol’, YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 25, 2021), https://news.yahoo.com/trump-jan-6-rally-crowd-storm-thecapitol-video-184828622.html (reporting that rioters stormed the Capitol immediately following a speech
by Trump in which he stated, “We’re going to walk down to the Capitol . . . you’ll never take back our
country with weakness. You have to show strength, and you have to be strong.”). For inciting this deadly
insurrection against Congress, President Trump, for the second time in four years, was impeached by the
House and acquitted by the Senate. Anthony Zurcher, Trump Impeachment Trial: What Verdict Means
for Trump, Biden and America, BBC (Feb. 13, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada56057849.
176
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Rejects Texas Suit Seeking to Subvert Election, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/11/us/politics/supreme-court-election-texas.html (Jan. 15, 2021)
(“[President Trump] was right that an election dispute would end up in the Supreme Court. But he was
quite wrong to think the [C]ourt, even after he appointed a third of its members, would do his bidding.”).
177
Jane Mayer, Is Ginni Thomas a Threat to the Supreme Court?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 21, 2022),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/01/31/is-ginni-thomas-a-threat-to-the-supreme-court. Ginni
Thomas has declared that America is in “existential danger” because of the “deep state” and the “fascist
left,” which includes “transsexual fascists.” Id.
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foreseeable when the first draft of this Note was submitted at the beginning
of 2022.
3. Self-Inflicted Wounds
In spite of this outrageous effort by a sitting President to deny his
reelection defeat, America’s constitutional institutions withstood the
challenge. Federal courts were unanimous in their conclusions that the
election challenges were without merit, and President Biden was
inaugurated without further incident. But, while President Biden announced
his intention to “lower the temperature” in politics, political tribalism
remains intense. Any hope that Republicans would abandon President
Trump and his authoritarian tendencies following his eviction from the
White House has evaporated, as Republicans “continue to demonstrate
respect for, or fear of” President Trump’s influence in the party.178 In
deference to the imposing stakes and perhaps fearful of Republican
constitutional hardball, Justice Breyer chose to retire from the Court in
January 2022, while President Biden still presided over a Democratic
Senate.179 A firm institutionalist and committed constitutional pragmatist,
Justice Breyer knelt before the power of partisan politics.180 While Justice
Breyer might recoil over such an appearance of partisanship, his timely
retirement blazed a clear path for Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s relatively
tranquil confirmation as the first Black woman on the Supreme Court.181
Justice Jackson’s tenure is nascent, yet her indomitable confirmation
represents a sturdy volley of Democratic return fire. Partisan parity was
conserved, though Republican appointees still dominate. Therefore, the
Breyer-Jackson swap demonstrates an attempt to restore judicial legitimacy
by resorting to constitutional hardball.
However, anxiety over the Supreme Court’s legitimacy crisis reached a
thunderous crescendo when a draft of Justice Samuel Alito’s astonishing
opinion182 overruling Roe v. Wade in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
178

Anthony Zurcher, JD Vance: Trump-Backed Contender Clinches Ohio Senate Race, BBC (May
4, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-61315649. According to Senator Romney, an
avowed critic, President Trump is also “very likely” to be the Republican nominee for President in 2024
and “[i]t’s hard to imagine anything that would derail his support.” Dominick Mastrangelo, Romney:
Trump ‘Very Likely’ to Be 2024 Republican Nominee if He Runs Again, HILL (May 5, 2022, 10:08 AM),
https://thehill.com/news/3478176-romney-trump-very-likely-to-be-2024-republican-nominee-if-he-runs
-again/.
179
Jeffrey Rosen, The Court Loses Its Chief Pragmatist, ATLANTIC (Jan. 26, 2022),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/01/stephen-breyer-retirement-supreme-court-biden/619331/.
180
Id.
181
Mary Clare Jalonick and Mark Sherman, Jackson Confirmed as First Black Female High Court
Justice, AP NEWS (Apr. 7, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/ketanji-brown-jackson-supreme-courtconfirmation-f39263cdbb0c59c8a20a48edf9b6786e.
182
Samuel Alito, 1st Draft, Supreme Court of the United States, No. 19–1392, Thomas E. Dobbs,
State Health Officer of the Mississippi Department of Health, et al., Petitioners, v. Jackson Women’s
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183

Organization was leaked to the press under mysterious circumstances.184
The new conservative majority’s willingness to eviscerate Roe and reward
conservatives’ decades-long effort to dismantle reproductive rights for women
has “rocked” confidence in the Court and left commentators to speculate over
what precedents could be next.185 Republican authoritarianism and the
conservative Supreme Court supermajority’s eagerness to make drastic and
consequential transformations to American law cast uneasiness on the future
legitimacy of the Supreme Court.186 In the 2022 term, the Court previewed its
“ruthlessly efficient” power to render “speedy and definitive” outcomes on
issues ranging from abortion, guns, religion, and climate change in favor of
“the conservative movement and the Republican party.”187 Thus, upcoming
election cycles may well become the crucible where pro-democratic forces are
tested and either embraced or discarded.
The tumult of the Trump administration has yet to be fully unpacked,
but it demonstrates the challenging landscape that judges will face as they
make decisions. It also provides a chilling template for how declining
judicial independence could undermine democracy.
Health Organization, et al. (Feb. 10, 2022); Josh Gerstein & Alexander Ward, Supreme Court Has Voted
to Overturn Abortion Rights, Draft Opinion Shows, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/
02/supreme-court-abortion-draft-opinion-00029473 (May 3, 2022, 2:14 PM) (publicizing the leaked
draft opinion).
183
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., No. 19-1392 (U.S. June 24, 2022).
184
See Calvin Woodward, Hannah Fingerhut & The Associated Press, Supreme Court Leak Shakes
Trust in One More American Pillar, FORTUNE (May 7, 2022, 9:58 AM), https://fortune.com/2022/05/07/
supreme-court-leak-shakes-trust-in-one-more-american-pillar/ (contextualizing the impropriety of the
leaked opinion and the demise of a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy with polls that show how
trust in the Supreme Court has deteriorated).
185
Id. Chief Justice Roberts called the leak “absolutely appalling,” which seemed to authenticate
the veracity of the opinion and Roe’s demise. Ariane de Vogue and Maria Cartaya, John Roberts Calls
the Supreme Court Leak “Absolutely Appalling”, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/05/politics/johnroberts-supreme-court-leak/ (May 6, 2022, 8:08 AM).
When the Dobbs decision was released, the public became privy to Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion
on the issue. Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment of Dobbs, only. See Dobbs, slip op. at 1
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part). Chief Justice Roberts wrote that he would have taken a more
“measured” approach in deciding this case, one that “extends [to women] a reasonable opportunity to
choose, but need not extend any further . . . to viability.” Id. at 1–2. Chief Justice Roberts called the
decision “thoughtful and thorough,” yet admonished it for being “dramatic[,] . . . consequential[,] . . .
[and] unnecessary” for the issues presented in Dobbs. Id. at 2.
186
The Court’s conservative majority is willing and able to annihilate decades of precedent, which
may dramatically alter American life as it is currently known. See, e.g., Dobbs, slip op. at 3 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion in Dobbs, ominously wrote, “In future cases, we
should reconsider all of this Court’s substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence,
and Obergefell. Because any substantive due process decision is demonstrably erroneous, we have a duty
to correct the error established in those precedents.” Id. (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
187
See generally Mark Joseph Stern, Why Today Felt Like the Most Hopeless Day of the SCOTUS
Term, SLATE (Jun. 30, 2022), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/06/climate-change-epa-supremecourt-revolution.html. In this excoriation of the Supreme Court’s July 2022 term and congressional
realities, Stern writes that “[r]eal power in this country no longer lies in the people. It resides at the
Supreme Court.” Id.
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B. Courts Must Hold the Line Against Authoritarianism
1. Authoritarians Target Courts
President Trump’s hectic term inspired substantial amounts of recent
scholarship analyzing the impact of his brand of populist, extremist
demagoguery on our constitutional system, as well as its impact on the
judiciary. In How Democracies Die, Professors Steven Levitsky and Daniel
Ziblatt take stock of the emerging threats to American democracy.188 Their
research examines the weaponizing of institutions by studying countries
where democracies had been subverted and fatally broken down until
despotism prevailed.189 Levitsky and Ziblatt identify how would-be
authoritarians around the world, typically after winning democratic
elections, take persistent steps to subtly undermine nonpartisan institutions
like courts—in legal ways, at first—under the pretext of reforming
democracy, “cleaning up” elections, “combating corruption,” or “enhancing
national security.”190 After eroding public confidence in courts, a president
has the latitude to remove perceived opponents and instill loyalists.191
Levitsky and Ziblatt illustrate how authoritarians in several countries
eventually obtained de facto control of the judiciary. Violating judicial
norms was a crucial step in the process of democratic breakdown because it
gave the authoritarians both shields against legal consequences and swords
for unleashing their institutional authority on political opponents.192 Here,
the emphasis on democratic backsliding as a gradual process highlights the
reasons to be concerned with the decisions of judicial actors, who represent
the rule of law. Individual choices to ignore or dismiss threats to democracy
can have tremendous and tragic impacts. Judges must be vigilant and
uncompromising against these kinds of threats to the constitutional order.
To explain the impact of individual choices, Levitsky and Ziblatt
describe how democratic institutions operate using unwritten rules and
shared codes of conduct that serve as “soft guardrails” against democratic

188
See generally LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2. Significantly, Levitsky and Ziblatt’s book on
the precarious state of American democracy was published in 2018—obviously preceding President
Trump’s astonishing attempts to undermine faith in the 2020 election and his encouragement of his
supporters to storm the Capitol as Congress counted electoral votes on January 6, 2021. Id. Additionally,
reading How Democracies Die reportedly motivated President Biden to run for president against
President Trump. Ashley Parker, Weightlifting, Gatorade, Birthday Calls: Inside Biden’s Day, WASH.
POST (May 24, 2021, 5:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-daily-routinegatorade/2021/05/23/b6f608c2-b40e-11eb-a3b5-f994536fe84a_story.html.
189
LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 7–10.
190
Id. at 77.
191
Id. at 79.
192
See generally id. at 79–81 (describing how four authoritarian leaders in former democracies
eventually succeeded in conscripting the judiciary to their partisan goals, ultimately leading to the
subjugation of their people under despotic regimes).
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decline. The constitutional system survives and provides Madisonian
checks and balances because these guardrails inculcate politics with two
fundamental values. The first value is mutual toleration, which means
dealing with political opponents as constitutional rivals rather than as
existential enemies.194 The second value is institutional forbearance, which
means “avoiding actions that, while respecting the letter of the law,
obviously violates its spirit.”195 In other words, democracies die when
institutional actors discard these two values and when they fail to restrain
actors who reject them. Thus, our constitutional order should have a space
that promotes and protects mutual toleration and institutional forbearance.
In light of the role of the judiciary, then, institutionalist judges are the best
actors available to fill that space.
2. How Institutionalism Promotes Legitimacy
For courts, which serve a critical purpose in the constitutional system,
retaining legitimacy and public confidence is intrinsically linked to the
health of democracy. Although there is persistent faith that American
democracy is exceptional or that the Constitution is a “perfect” document,
the failures of formerly solid democracies around the world demonstrate
why judges must be vigilant and uncompromising in response to these
threats. Courts stand as a bulwark against the trampling of political and
human rights by partisan actors. Further, authoritarian governments pose
particular threats to women, people of color, ethnic minorities, religious
minorities, and LGBTQ+ individuals. As such, the judiciary must not
capitulate to, enable, or ignore the increasing aggression of authoritarian
forces in a democracy.
Institutionalists tend to the legitimacy of the judiciary by making
judgments on the basis of extralegal considerations to steer courts away from
bad outcomes that could harm its legitimacy. Thus, because courts are integral
institutions to the health and wellbeing of democracy, institutionalists
contribute to the protection of rights of citizens contemplated by the
Constitution. Yet, there remains significant skepticism of judges who set aside
legal analysis and use only the case at bar to address a pressing legitimacy
crisis.196 Professor Tara Leigh Grove posits that there is no consistent,
accepted theory that allows judges to be transparent about deciding cases
193

Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
195
Id. at 106.
196
See Grove, supra note 166, at 2269 (noting that “it does not appear to be legally legitimate for a
Justice to vote in a way she deems legally incorrect in order to preserve the Court’s public reputation”).
Grove argues that the way scholars discuss “legitimacy” is incomplete and should focus on the difference
between legal legitimacy (i.e., a decision is legally correct), moral legitimacy (i.e., the decision is morally
preferable), and sociological legitimacy (i.e., the decision is respected by the American people). Id. at
2244, 2269.
194
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based on legitimacy, arguing that“[i]t is difficult to imagine a Justice saying
openly to a litigant, ‘The government has violated the Constitution. But we
cannot rule in your favor, because the consequences for our institution might
be too great.’”197 Grove’s point is valid in that greater transparency about
process would benefit democracy and that judges should have more concrete
guidance for resolving “trade-offs among types of legitimacy.”198 This Note
does not attempt to construct such a legal system that may, in fact, be overly
unrealistic and unachievable. Likewise, Grove concedes that any judicial
reforms would first demand improvements to the political process.199 But,
given the urgent crises of today, this Note posits that devising new laws to
account for legitimacy concerns may not matter or, at least, they may be a
fruitless exercise. First, any judicial reform would require the involvement
of the political branches, which is unlikely given intense partisan hostilities.
Second, whether our justifications for institutionalists are based on a
desire to place a unique trust in judges rather than political actors, or a belief
that the Constitution is an evolving document, or a preference for the current
way that judges resolve cases, tending to legitimacy is an inherent concern
of the judiciary. Judges not only can act to strengthen courts against
authoritarianism, but it is their constitutional duty to do so. In short, the
present moment demands affirmative action from judges to protect
vulnerable Americans from the clear and present danger posed by
anti-institutionalist tyranny.
At this vista, we can see a recent example of how the Court threads the
needle between two bad outcomes to reach a place that maximizes its
perceived legitimacy. In Trump v. Vance200—another opinion crafted by
Chief Justice Roberts—the Supreme Court considered whether the
President enjoys “absolute immunity from state criminal process.”201 The
consequences of finding that he did or, alternatively, that a state prosecutor
must show a “heightened need” before issuing a subpoena to a sitting
president implied that the President was, at least partially, above the law.202
Given that the opinion was announced months before the 2020 election, the
Court also had the power to determine whether President Trump could
continue to hide his tax returns from the public.203 Ultimately, the opinion
asserts the common law maxim that, “[i]n our judicial system, ‘the public
has a right to every man’s evidence.’”204 It continues, “Since the earliest days
of the Republic, ‘every man’ has included the President of the United
197

Id. at 2271.
Id.
199
Id. at 2275.
200
140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020).
201
Id. at 2420.
202
Id. at 2429.
203
Id. at 2412.
204
Id. at 2420, 2431.
198
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States,” concluding that the Constitution does not support holding state
subpoenas of a President to a higher standard and that a New York
prosecutor could subpoena Trump’s tax records.205 But, Chief Justice
Roberts provided that the President could argue that “compliance with a
particular subpoena would impede his constitutional duties,” and the Court
returned the case to the lower courts for further litigation.206 Litigating this
issue meant that the public would not see Trump’s tax records before voting
in the 2020 election.207 Yet, although the public did not see Trump’s tax
records before the 2020 election, Chief Justice Roberts swatted down the
strains of President Trump’s argument that would have permitted him to
behave like an authoritarian above judicial accountability.208 The
institutionalism of Trump v. Vance sets a firm standard for executive
accountability, while simultaneously reducing the political impact of a
Supreme Court decision in an election year—that is, by avoiding headlines
accusing the Supreme Court of playing an active role in defeating President
Trump at the ballot box. For these reasons, Vance’s institutionalist attitude
fulfilled dual purposes: checking the power of the President and bolstering
the legitimacy of the judiciary.
In the judicial branch, decisions about the workability of outcomes are
a part of the job. As a result of its resilience, adherence to norms, and
structural continuity, the law makes the judiciary autonomous as compared
to the political branches.209 Judges navigate this inherent autonomy in the
context of formal laws that limit available options with the aim of arriving
at outcomes that represent the best choices for the given parties and for
future courts. In many ways, then, all judges whose decisions impact the
lives of fellow citizens engage in a kind of institutionalist reasoning
about good and bad consequences. Overall legitimacy—legal, moral, or
sociological—is really another choice about the consequences that judges
make. The inherently fragile American constitutional system contemplates
such a role for courts. To preserve it, there is a strong incentive for allowing
institutionalists the latitude to shore up the legitimacy of the judicial branch
in an era of democratic backsliding. Far from threatening it, the American
republic may depend upon judges making choices for the right reasons.
205

Id.
Id. at 2425–2429.
207
See Adam Serwer, The Roberts Court Completes Trump’s Cover-Up, ATLANTIC (July 10, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/the-roberts-court-has-completed-trumps-coverup/614023/ (advancing an argument that Chief Justice Roberts was motivated by a desire to affirm the
independence of the Supreme Court’s conservative majority while simultaneously granting President
Trump what he wanted—hiding his tax returns from the public before the election).
208
Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2429–2431 (explaining why a state grand jury seeking to subpoena a
President’s records does not need to satisfy a “heightened need standard”). This roundly rejects the
reasoning of the President’s lawyers and opens the door for future state criminal investigations of the
President.
209
Graber, supra note 9, at 7, 10.
206
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CONCLUSION
As this Note has imparted, the stakes for courts are precipitous. Judicial
decisions impact rights, duties, fundamental freedoms, and, ultimately, the
fabric of our constitutional republic. Thus, following four years of a
profoundly anti-institutionalist president and during a time of extreme
political polarization, any weaknesses in the foundations of the judicial
branch as a component of American democracy will be exposed. With these
weaknesses being exposed, observing how the political branches of
government have sought to exploit them by playing constitutional hardball
makes clear the urgency of repairing, reforming, and fortifying democratic
institutions.210 President Biden has at least four years to make his mark on
the judiciary and to fulfill his promise to cool the crucible of American
politics, and the institutionalists will remain relevant.
Institutionalist judges have their reasons, making judgments informed
by extralegal considerations that are steered towards the Court’s ability to
maintain its viability as a legitimate institution under the law. This Note
identified three important extralegal considerations. But, this Note also took
pains to clarify that it does not represent a ringing endorsement of such
considerations and that judges are susceptible to making bad judgments
about the propriety of deferring to one or another in any given case. Instead,
we entrust judges to make good-faith determinations on an ad hoc basis
because of a belief in the power of the Constitution to constrain them and
because of a belief in the court’s role as a neutral arbiter. This Note also
provides some thoughts on why, exactly, the system allows institutionalists
to act in that way, which is related to an idea about the sanctity of democratic
institutions and the flexibility we want for institutions that stand in the way
of authoritarian forces.
Further scholarship could help make better determinations about both
the legality of these judgments and the actual efficacy of institutionalist
210

As a result of Democrats retaking the Senate, some Democrats called for constitutional hardball of
their own, exemplified by Justice Breyer finally capitulating to relentless liberal pressure to retire so that
President Biden can name his replacement before Republicans have the opportunity to retake the Senate.
See Dahlia Lithwick, The Deep Irony of Stephen Breyer’s Bare-Knuckled Exit From the Supreme Court,
SLATE (Jan. 26, 2022, 2:29 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/01/stephen-breyer-justiceretirement-supreme-court-reason.html (“It is ironic that the sitting justice who has staked his career on the
proposition that justices are not political actors, not partisan shills, and not, in his parlance, a bunch of ‘junior
varsity politicians’ is choosing to leave the court in a move timed precisely to coincide with a closing window
of opportunity for the president and the Senate.”); see also Nick Niedzwiadek, Biden Signs Executive Order
on Supreme Court Reform Commission, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/09/bidensupreme-court-reform-commission-480582 (Apr. 9, 2021, 12:35 PM) (reporting on President Biden’s
announcement that he is “empaneling a commission to examine possible reforms to the Supreme Court and
federal judiciary”). At present, the Supreme Court is controlled by a 6-3 majority of Republican-appointed
conservative Justices, with Chief Justice Roberts increasingly siding with the liberals and Justice Kavanaugh
emerging as a swing Justice. Id. As a result, Democrats—who regained control of the political branches in
2021—have begun to plot how to counter that majority, including, recently, by studying the idea of adding
more seats to the Supreme Court. Id.
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tactics. For example, this Note does not offer a way to measure the durability
of decisions issued by institutionalists or link it to public confidence in the
judiciary. Moreover, this Note does not try to develop and prescribe legal
reforms that would constrain judicial actors, while also allowing them to
shut down would-be authoritarians. Instead, it is more important to
understand and accept the gravity of this new American style of authoritarian
and how this movement exploits institutions such as courts. For now, saving
American democracy from further backsliding during times of crisis justifies
allowing judges the latitude to make the pro-democratic decisions.

